Should the Astros consider Starting Pitching tandems 40% of the time??

The Background to the Question:
Heading into the 2018 baseball seasons, a number of pitching-related facts are apparent:

• The Astros are the defending World Series Champions (I never get tired of saying that!)
• There is a perception that the Astros struggled to consistently fill their rotation throughout 2017, and as a result, the bullpen felt gassed at the end of the year*
• Their bullpen - at least in terms of their full-time relief pitching - struggled in the playoffs**
• The Astros' most frequent starters' in 2017 are not what one would define as "workhorses"***
• The Astros appear to have an excess of starting pitchers next year, including presumed top-5 of Justin Verlander, Dallas Keuchel, Gerrit Cole, Lance McCullers and Charlie Morton.  Other available starters with significant major-league starting experience include Brad Peacock, Collin McHugh and Frances Martes.  This doesn't include other potential starters with upper-level minor-league success, such as David Paulino, Forrest Whitley and Rogelio Armenteros.

* Astros starters' IP were 10th in baseball with 899.2.  But, the Astros managed only 1 complete game, and handsomely lead the league in "cheap wins" (wins in non-quality starts) with 23.  The league average was 14.  The 899.2IP is more a measure of the effectiveness of the pitching staff, rather than the durability.

** FIP's 2017 regular season versus 2017 post season for Astros relievers >5IP in postseason: Ken Giles 2.39 / 7.59; Will Harris 3.33 / 5.66; Chris Devenski 3.49 / 5.53; Joe Musgrove 4.38 / 8.56

*** Mike Fiers was the only Astro to start more than 25 games, and he will be pitching for the Tigers in 2018.  Fiers was followed in number of games started by Charlie Morton (25), Dallas Keuchel (23), Lance McCullers (22) and Bradley J. Peacock (21).  Of those, only Keuchel has at least one 200IP season under his belt (2).

The Astros' rotation looks much more durable entering 2018, compared to 2017.  Recall that the rotation entering the 2017 season looked like Keuchel, McCullers, Morton, McHugh and Fiers.  Three seasons of 200IP or more* lie amongst that starting five.  Heading into 2018, the presumed or projected rotation of Verlander**, Keuchel, Cole, McCullers and Morton looks a lot more durable, with 14 seasons of 200IP or more on their resumes.***

* I know it is a dirty, imperfect cutoff, but I am going to use 200IP seasons as a measure of "durability"  in this article.  To pitch 200 innings, a starter would need to take the ball 32 times per year, and average six-and-one-third innings each start.  I think that is a good proxy measure of (i) the ability to take the ball repeatedly over the course of the year, and (ii) the ability to remain effective enough so that the starter can pitch deep-ish into most of their games.

** Verlander is an incredible workhorse.  10 seasons of 200IP since 2005, led baseball in IP three times in four years.  One of the under-reported positives of the Verlander trade - not only did they add a potential top-of-the-rotation starter, but they added one who doesn't seem to ever get injured.  His non-debut career-low for IP in a season is 133.1, which was recorded in 2015.  As long as Verlander is effective, he looks like a good bet to continue to rack up 30+ games starter per year.

*** It is not so much the raw number of 200IP seasons because 10 of them are attributable to Verlander, but more the fact that three different starters have multiple 200IP seasons in 2018, rather than one player in 2017.

So how might it look??

This idea is pretty simple.  In games started by Verlander, Keuchel and Cole, it should business-as-usual with regards to starting pitching and bullpen use.  This is partly because all of them are top-of-the-rotation types, and partly because they have a history of durability and effectiveness as outlined above.  For the sake of argument and to preserve the bullpen, lets not put them on back to back days.

To me, McCullers seems to be an injury risk going forward.  He is small, yet he pumps gas in the mid-90's much of the time.  He throws breaking balls around 50% of the time, which must put stress on his arm and shoulder.  He has missed time with injuries the last few seasons*.  I am not saying he can never throw a 200IP season, but (i) I think it is unlikely and (ii) it won't happen this year, because the Astros would never let it happen following a season in which he pitched 118-and-two-thirds.

* Although, arguably, in his 2015 year, his "injuries" were as much about keeping innings off his arm.  Much more concerning is McCullers' history since then, when he has had to rework his throwing motion to alleviate stress on his shoulder.

Morton is older, but is in a similar boat.  He was famously signed last offseason after a year in which he managed 17IP, because of a torn hamstring.  In addition to this, Morton also suddenly added velocity to his fastball late in his career, and I wonder how this might play with shoulders and elbows (although there is no indication that this is currently a problem).  Morton's career high in IP is 171.2, set way back in 2011.  Since then, his year-to-year inning totals are as follows: 50.1, 116, 157.1, 129, 17.1 and 146.2 (the last of which was with the Astros).

McCullers and Morton are probably the key players in this consideration.  Both are pitchers with incredible stuff, and are virtually unhittable when they are locating with both their hard and breaking stuff.  If the Astros think that this idea would take a significant number of innings from McCullers and Morton, then I doubt they would consider it.  However, given the high chance that the Astros make the playoffs next year, I would rather see both entering October with a solid year under their belts and feeling ready to pitch for another month, rather than setting career highs in IP during the regular season, and feeling gassed for the postseason.

So your potential rotation, with tandems, could well look something like this:

1. Justin Verlander
2. Lance McCullers / Brad Peacock
3. Gerrit Cole
4. Charlie Morton / Collin McHugh
5. Dallas Keuchel

A couple of notes here.  Firstly, the order is not important, and has been created as much for demonstration purposes as anything else.  Note that the only back-to-back "normal" days for the 'pen would be on starts from Dallas Keuchel and Justin Verlander - both the Astros' most effective horses.  This could change, of course, as the season progresses. Secondly, the tandem pairs are also negotiable.  I don't have a strong opinion around who goes with who, but I think that McCullers and Morton are the best bet to 'lead' both pairs, and therefore probably should not be paired together, despite what happened in Game 7 of the ALCS.  Also, McCullers and Peacock together should bring back warm memories of Game 3 of the World Series, when Bradley J finished the game with three-and-two-thirds of scoreless, hitless baseball.

What are the advantages??

I think that the principle advantage of this is to spread the workload more evenly around your starting and relief pitching, with an eye toward October.  The argument for that is laid out earlier in this article, and is based on the premise that health, for starting pitchers, is almost stand-alone skill with a number of contributing variables (such as height, build, in-game pitch management, mechanics, conditioning and genetics).

But would this also address the "times-through-the-order" penalty??  The premise around the times-through-the-order penalty is that starting pitchers tend to struggle the more times through the order that they face an opposition batting lineup.  I guess there are a number of factors here, including the fact that they are likely to be tiring more the longer the game wears on, and the fact that the opposition batters have had more time to adjust to what they are throwing.

However, the times-through-the-order penalty also as a potential source of bias - if a starting pitcher is not effective, then they will not get to face the opposition 3 or 4 times through the order, and therefore their ineffective outings are masked by not contributing to statistics from late-game situations.  In addition to this, ineffective and/or short outings are likely to further bias the sample by artificially increasing the early game stats.*

* For example, if a Justin Verlander is dominant, and shuts the opponent down for the first 18 outs, then he probably gets to go through the order a third, and perhaps a fourth, time.  Let's say that the last six outs are also the fourth time through the order.  The only reason that he is even getting that opportunity is because he was effective the first three times through the order.

Lets then pretend that Justin Verlander then gets shelled in his next start, being knocked out in the 3rd inning after giving up 8 ER.  He wouldn't get an opportunity to pitch the third and fourth time through the order, and his stats for the first two times through would look pretty awful.  So the real effect of these two starts is that the late-game statistics would be largely dependant on early-game dominance, whereas early-game ineffectiveness protects the late-game statistics to an extent.  Therefore, the times-through-the-order penalty, on a global level, is most likely more uneven than one would think based on the statistics.  There are also issues around sample-size discrepancies.  One solution would be to look in detail at the more granular data, such as batter exit velocities and launch angles, for a better guide of the actual extent of the penalty.

Below are some measures of the times-through-the-order penalty for the seven potential Astros' starters for 2017, acknowledging the imperfections mentioned above.  The format is name: OPS's in order from first to fourth; wOBA's in the same order in italics (sorry about the morass of numbers):

• Justin Verlander: .578, .739, .659, .753; .252, .314, .287, .340
• Dallas Keuchel: .531, .678, .583, .1.411; .232, .298, .260, .594
• Gerrit Cole*: .749, .627, .852, .929; .320, .271, .360, .392
• Lance McCullers: .536, .664, 1.004, 2.000 (in 1 at-bat); .244, .292, .422, .877
• Charlie Morton: .544, .789, .789, .000 (in 5 at-bats); .245, .339, .335, .000
• Brad Peacock (as SP only): .420, .691, .995, .000 (in 1 at-bat); .196, .304, .420, .000
• Collin McHugh: .726, .653, .949; .322, .281, .396

* obviously, Cole pitched in the NL last year, which may have led to a few removals because his place in the batting order was due up.

Ok, so the above table turns up a few clues.  Brad Peacock was actually the most effective of all the starting pitchers the first time through the other.  Verlander and Keuchel appeared to be the two most dominant pitchers on the third time through the order.  Gerrit Cole seemed to tire some.  Lance McCullers and Collin McHugh appeared to struggle the most with the third time through the order last year.  But broadly speaking, these statistics support the overall shape of the rotation and proposed candidates for tandem stating.

What would some other advantages be??  I can think of a few, and you may wish to add to them in the comments:

• Keeping effective pitchers in a regular rotation
• Distributing more innings to the non-starters in a manageable way (or, predictable innings for Peacock and McHugh)
• "Resting" the bullpen for 40% of games
• Having 7 pitchers on the ML roster who are stretched out and/or are used to multi-inning appearances, meaning that spot starters are easier to find without having to muck around with the 40-man roster
• Having the opportunity to "flip" pitchers around - for example McHugh could start one of every three games, and Morton two, or they could take it on a start-to-start basis, in order to minimise injury and fatigue and keep the pitchers on regular rotation
• Better pitching management in the event of double headers
• Rest days can be used more effectively, as the tandems can be bumped up a day if the other starters would benefit from extra rest
• Days of work would be more predictable, allowing relievers to rest, work on the side or work with long toss or weights to keep themselves fresh during days off

What do the innings numbers look like??

Ha-ha!! An exercise in futility.  People have been trying to project innings pitched since baseball was invented, I imagine.  But, assuming no injuries (another ha!) let's take a look at how this may all shake out...

The baseball season is 162 games long, 81 home, 81 away.  In all home games, the home side will have to pitch 9 frames.  In some of the away games, the away team will pitch either 8 innings (if they lose) or 9 innings (if they win).  Lets pretend the Astros a record of approximately .500 on the road.

Therefore: total number of IP = (81*9) + (41*8) + (40*9).  Or 1417 IP in total to distribute around the staff.

Lets give Verlander, Keuchel and Cole 200IP apiece, because we have been kind of obsessed with that figure to this point.  That leaves 817 innings to be pitched.

Lets then pretend that the tandems each make 33 starts, and throw 9IP each time (297 innings), like it is all drawn up.  That subtracts another 594 innings.

So a McCullers and Peacock tandem would throw 297 innings, and it would have to be divided up somehow.  If McCullers went five each time, he would throw 165IP on the year, whereas Peacock would throw 132IP.  For that particular tandem, I probably would weight it a little more toward 50-50, but one could squint, and see both pitchers being able to handle that workload.  Of course, there may be games where McCullers is efficient, and manages to go 6 instead of five.  Or there may be times when Peacock winds up getting stretched out for more than 4 innings at a time, either because he is the "starter" for that day, or because he enters the game earlier than anticipated for some reason.

That leaves 223 innings between 5 other 'pen pitchers, or about 45IP per year per pitcher, if evenly distributed.

This is a quick-and-dirty analysis, of course, which does not account for extra-inning games, or other multi-inning relievers, such as Chris Devenski.  But it provides a useful guide as to what sort of numbers we are looking at.  Personally, having a closer who has only thrown 50-odd innings over the season entering the postseason seems like a great idea.*

* Ken Giles' regular season IP since his debut in 2014: 45.2, 70, 65.2, 62.2 with 7.2 more innings of 11.74 ERA in the postseason.

But there would be disadvantages too, right??

I imagine there would be some disadvantages, too, including but not restricted to:

• Ego of the starters.  There is a certain sense of achievement around being a starting pitcher, and this way four of the potential Astros starters would need to give that up
• Ego of the bullpen.  This means that narrow leads in 40% of games would most likely not be given to the Nominal Closer to protect.  I don't really care about that, but some would, possibly including the Closer himself.  Fewer saves may mean less money in arbitration.  Giles did just win his arbitration case against the Astros, but that is largely inconsequential
• Negative press.  This is a great idea, until Collin McHugh or Brad Peacock blows a save in the bottom of the ninth.  Then, because it is a "different" idea, the hacks will go nuts, writing it off a case of a smart team outsmarting itself.  (I am, of course, assuming that this is a "smart" idea).  This is how things work in Baseball, given the traditional nature of the the game and how it should be managed.  This leads on to...
• Managing high leverage innings over the course of the season.  All of this becomes much easier if the Astros jump out to an early division lead, and cruise the rest of the season.  If that happens, they can afford to throw the odd high-leverage inning (9th inning, one run lead) at a Peacock or McHugh.  If they don't get out to an early lead, they may not have that luxury.
• Getting shelled or long, extra-inning games.  This is not a great idea if a starter - especially one of the "horses", records a very short start.  Then it may throw the 'pen into disarray because you no longer carry a long-man, or force one of the next tandem starting pair into action a day early.  If this was an infrequent occurrence, it could be managed fairly easily, but a bad week or two would throw this idea into chaos.
• Mopping up.  This plan essentially moves the mop-up guys into a starting role.  Who mops up in the event that inconsequential innings need to be absorbed??  Are you comfortable seeing Joe Smith or Ken Giles throwing in a 10-run game?
• Long breaks.  Bullpen guys do best with regular work.  This idea is less flexible for the 'pen guys, because there would be days blocked out where they almost definitely would not get to appear.
• Predictability.  Imagine being the other team.  "Right guys, we need to read up on Lance McCullers.  Then we know Brad Peacock will follow him.  We don't have to worry about any of the bullpen - we know we probably won't see them today".  So there's that... not sure how relevant that may be.
• In game timing.  This may be less of a problem than I would think, as all of Peacock, McHugh, Morton and McCullers came out of the 'pen at various times during the postseason.  Peacock and McCullers also tandem-started in the minors.  I would think they would manage their throwing routine better as the season went on, but there may be a couple of hairy moments if the game threw up a couple of very quick innings in a row around the time the second pitcher was warming up.
• Roster inflexibility - adding one more mop-up guy may restrict the size of the bench.  I will discuss this in more detail below to see how it may work.

I am sure that there are other disadvantages, too.  I would suggest that a key unmentioned disadvantage would be watching Nolan Ryan's head explode in disbelief as he watches Lance McCullers being pulled with a shutout going after 5.  Real men, after all, should be able to go 300IP per year, while striking out 450.

How would this look with the roster??

This is perhaps the main area of concern.  I don't think that this idea can be easily implemented without the result of reduced flexibility in other areas.  But the Astros may think it is worthwhile, if the advantages were to outweigh the disadvantages.

So lets fill out the roster.  In our hypothetical setup, we would need 7 starting or tandem pitchers: Verlander, Keuchel, McCullers, Cole, Peacock, Morton, McHugh.  

We also need 9 position players: McCann, Gurriel, Altuve, Correa, Bregman, Fisher, Springer and Reddick.  Gattis will DH for the purposes of this exercise.  That makes 16 out of the 25 man roster, leaving 9 spots for the bench and the remainder of the bullpen.

We need some reserves, and we already think that we can manage with a bench of four.  So lets go with Stassi, González and Marisnick for three of the spots.  Marisnick can cover the three outfield positions, González can cover all infield positions and LF as well as providing the sole lefty bat off the bench, and Stassi is the backup catcher.  The Astros have already suggested that this is how they are entering 2018 with regards to catching.  Lets throw a bat in there as well - say Tyler White, who seems to have the best combination of upside and proximity to the Majors.  But you could bang Tony Kemp or A.J. Reed in here if you want a lefty.  Or J.D. Davis if you want power.*

* J.D. Davis has the potential advantage of being a mop-up pitcher too.  He was considered as a legitimate draft choice as a pitcher, and is known to have a great arm.  Last year, he threw 1.2 innings, allowing one hit and one walk while striking out three.  I know the Astros love them some flexibility, and I doubt that this gets any real consideration at all, but if it is close between Davis and another player... could this be the tie-breaker??

So that leaves us with a 5 man "bullpen" (not including the two tandem starters).  I am going out on a limb here, and thinking that Ken Giles, Will Harris and Joe Smith get three of the spots.  Chris Devenski will get the fourth spot*, and I would recommend that he nearly only be used in multi-inning stints to keep his overall appearance numbers down.  That leaves one slot in an otherwise all-righty 'pen.  If the Astros weren't worried about handedness, then Hector Rondon would be the fifth guy (although I think he is not that low on the pecking order), with James Hoyt as the main backup.

* unless the Astros want to send him to AAA to stretch out as a starter.  If that was the case, then is Devenski palpably worse than Collin McHugh??  One has options, and the other doesn't - and I think could be considered because the Astros hate giving something away for nothing.

If the Astros wanted a lefty, then Tony Sipp, Buddy Boshers, or Anthony Gose would be the three options currently on the 40-man roster.

Tony Sipp, of course, is owed 6MM this coming year, and has managed to survive on the Astros' roster despite two poor years.*  Buddy Boshers is new to the Astros' organisation, but has an option, potentially making it less likely that he breaks camp with the team.**  

* Tony Sipp's ERA / FIP over the last four years, in chronological order: 2014 - 3.38 / 2.93; 2015 - 1.99 / 2.93; 2016 - 4.99 / 6.19; 2017 - 5.79 / 5.22.  He hasn't been good for two years.  I think he gets Spring Training to show what he has, and that is all.  But the Astros seem to have supported him through thick and thin, so perhaps my read of the situation is poor.

** However, Boshers has a career line of .243/.277/.344 against same-handed batters, including a .220/.258/.397 line in 2017.  That said, much of that is from his dominance in pitching-friendly Target Field, where he has a career .230/.269/.284 line.  His stats are considerably worse on the road.

Anthony Gose is, potentially, the most interesting option here if the Astros want to carry a lefty.  If they don't put him on the roster, then he needs to be offered back to the Rangers.  This is Gose's second stint with the Astros, after he was involved in the Roy Oswalt trade with Philadelphia.  The Astros quickly flipped him for "hitting machine" Brett Wallace*, and Gose became a Blue Jay instead.  However, last year, Gose started transitioning to a pitching role in 2017, a decision that was made easier by (i) his career .240/.309/.348 batting line and (ii) a 100-mph fastball from the left side.

* the Batguy sums up Wallace's tenure with the Astros in this excellent article

Gose also potentially also fits with the Astros is as a two-way player.  The Rangers agreed to give him a look as both an outfielder and a pitcher, but failed to add him to their 40-man.  The Astros swooped in and grabbed in him the Rule 5 draft, and (at least) get to look at him in the offseason and in Spring Training.  While the Astros have stated (in the previous link) that they want to look at him as a pitcher, there are a variety of ways in which Gose's flexibility could be used.  This includes as a pinch runner*, or as someone who could spend some time in the outfield while Joe Smith or Will Harris comes on to mow down the righties.  It would be shock if Anthony Gose made Jake Marisnick expendable as a reserve outfielder, so I think any position role will be limited.  Taking this idea to the next level, Anthony Gose and J.D.Davis could combine to mop up innings, with Marwin González shuffling between third base and left field depending on the handedness of the batter.

* Gose has a career 57 stolen bases, against 23 times caught stealing. 

Conclusion
The Astros have enviable depth, particularly in the starting pitching ranks.  Having tandems to pair with McCullers and Morton is a possible solution to the problem of the durability of those two particular starters, while trying to keep them fresh for another possible October run.  This would arguably make the roster slightly less flexible, but as discussed above, there are other ideas that increase the flexibility of their roster, and may make this manageable.  If the Astros want to carry Anthony Gose on their 25-man roster to start the year, then his flexibility may contribute as part of the solution.

At this point, this is an interesting hypothetical discussion point.  So feel free to comment.  Does this idea have legs??  Or is it too crazy, even for the Astros?

ADDIT:
This article is a suggestion about what the Astros do in 2018.  It does not mean that Lance McCullers should always be used in tandem, or that he (or any other pitcher mentioned) is incapable of throwing 200 frames in a year, then being effective in the postseason.  I meant to put that into the original post, but it slipped my mind.  Apologies.

On the Astros' Trade Deadline

As you would have heard by now, the Astros are a bunch of incompetent hacks who know nothing about baseball.  They worship prospects, and as such, greedily wouldn't trade any of them to another organisation to acquire the 2017 version of 1998 Randy Johnson.  Useless!

Tyler sums it up nicely:

Imagine watching a team go from worst farm system and 3 straight years of 100 losses to 30 games over .500 and complaining your GM sucks

— Jeff Blogwell (@tylercstafford) July 31, 2017

And the Constable, as always, has a wonderful #hawttake:

The Astros' lead is now 10.5 games...
...on the team with the next best record in the American League

— Thickie Don (@AstrosCounty) July 31, 2017

And so while there was much wailing and gnashing of teeth last night on Astros Twitter, some much-loved analysts had some nuanced, more balanced takes:

I've fully formulated my trade deadline takes
1. I'm disappointed
2. The team is still good
3. This team, healthy, is capable of winning WS

— Aaron Ashcraft (@Aarcraft9) July 31, 2017

Most of the concern seemed to be principally around how three quality starting pitchers shifted teams in the weeks prior to the trade deadline.  Yu Darvish went to the Dodgers, Sonny Gray to the Yankees and José Quintana to the Cubs.  At times, the Astros have been linked to all of them - well, definitely the latter two, although Quintana was mostly in the offseason.  It is possible the Astros and the Rangers would have hooked up on a Darvish trade had the price been right (remember Carlos Corporan for Akeem Bostick), but it was mostly speculation on the part of the pundits that had the Astros interested in the pending FA from South Grapevine.

The Astros made one move, and it was a pretty reasonable one in my opinion.  They acquired Francisco Liriano and cash from the Jays, in exchange for Nori Aoki and Teoscar Hernandez.  In doing so, they cleared the way for Derek Fisher - who has impressed over the course of 2017 - to play everyday (or something approaching that), and freed up a 40-man spot.  Hernandez could be good, but he was not the Astros' top outfield prospect by any stretch (or even in the top 4).  They also have 38 (by my count) on the 40-man roster, with a couple of guys that would be good candidates to be released / clear waivers (looking at you, Tony Sipp).  So that offers them some flexibility to get some cheap innings eaters before the end of the season.

So... Liriano.  I think it was no secret that the Astros were in on pretty much every relief lefty with some velocity on the trade market.  Justin Wilson and Zach Britton were the main prizes at this deadline.  Wilson went to the Cubs a few days ago (along with pending FA Alex Avila) for a couple of top prospects.  Britton stayed put, with a number to tweets referring to the ever-increasing prices for him, or referencing Jeff Luhnow saying that they got 90% of the way to getting a deal done, but other teams just wanted too much.  Plus, the Orioles had a very strange deadline - sort of acquiring two middling players but neither buying, nor selling, nor addressing their obvious problems with starting pitching.  Extremely odd.

Fangraphs likes the Liriano acquisition... as long as he isn't being used as a starting pitcher.  Travis Sawchik makes a great point in this article - Liriano is death on lefties, but is being murdered by righties.  Also, his stuff may play up a little in a shorter role, so perhaps he can be trusted with an inning where there are two lefties projected to bat in the inning in a close game.  Or perhaps he is just a LOOGY.  Regardless, I think this was a nice pivot by the Front Office by eschewing costly lefty relievers and thinking outside the box.  I like it, and there is no way the prospect cost was too great, or crippling for future Astros teams.

I guess I principally wanted to make some points about the Dodgers, Yankees and Cubs.  First up, lets talk about the Dodgers, who had a quintessential Dodgers day.  The Dodgers have an awesome amount of financial resources, a strong farm system, and a great team with what looks like a core of young and mid-career star players.  What they have done over the last few years is spend big to amass significant depth, ignoring injury risk.  Their rotation has been - in recent years, Clayton Kershaw followed by whomever is healthy and has a pulse.  Could be Scott Kazmir, could be Rich Hill, could be Brandon McCarthy.  They seem to have had a clear plan to throw big money at often-injured starters, and use their depth to mix and match depending on who is available.

Well, the Dodgers did it again, volume-wise, at this deadline  They acquired not only Yu Darvish, but also bullpen lefties Tony Watson and Tony Cingrani.  And if that isn't enough for you, they also signed FA lefty Tommy Layne.  In return, they gave up Scott Van Slyke, Hendrik Clementina, Oneil Cruz, Angel German, Willie Calhoun, A.J. Alexy and Brendon Davis - or, according to Fangraphs' preseason prospects, a major-leaguer, their #6 prospect, and four "notable mentions".  One potential big-time prospect dealt by LA for a top-flight starter for two months, a lefty who lost his closing job, and a struggling lefty swingman / starter.  Nice work, but these deals seem to be mostly about volume and continuing the "throw spaghetti at the wall and see what sticks" philosophy.

The Yankees and Cubs are a different story.  They acquired solid starting pitchers with a few years of control in exchange for decent prospect hauls.  The White Sox did well, getting one solid blue-chipper and a second good prospect, whereas the A's took on ceiling, but injury-risk.

But the Cubs and Yankees have two things in common.  Thing one: they are in dogfights for their divisions, and there is no guarantee that they will even make their respective postseasons.  Thing two: check out their 2017 rotations and how long the starters near the top are signed for...

Cubs:
Jon Lester - signed through 2020
Jake Arrieta - FA this offseason
John Lackey - FA this offseason
Kyle Hendricks - controllable through 2021
Eddie Bulter - controllable through 2022

Also: Mike Montgomery - controllable through 2022, but no one wants him starting regularly

Yankees:
Luis Severino - controllable through 2023
Masahiro Tanaka - signed through 2020, but opt-out option this year
Michael Pineda - signed through 2018, but unlikely to pitch before then because of injury
Jordan Montgomery - controllable through 2023
CC Sabathia - FA this offseason

So both teams face losing some top-of-the-rotation starters to free agency (or injury) for next year.  And the pending free agents on the above lists have struggled this season, too, so this is not a simple case of re-signing what you are losing.  The Yankees also may lose Tanaka to an opt-out, and given that the starting pitching FA class is not a strong one, Tanaka may want to use it for another shot at free agency.  Also, neither of these teams would want to approach the offseason with a clear need that could easily be exploited by a Scott Boras-like agent, as they are both teams known to pay well when needed.  Both teams could have anticipated being fleeced this offseason if they had to sign two starting pitchers, and no one wants to be in that position, as you either spend too much, or sign someone for too long.  Either way, it sucks.

At this juncture, lets (i) note that the Astros are NOT in a division dogfight in 2017 and are nearly certain to make the playoffs and (ii) look at the 2017 Astros rotation going forward:
Dallas Keuchel - controllable through 2019
Lance McCullers Jr - controllable through 2022
Collin McHugh - controllable through 2020
Charlie Morton - controllable through 2018
Mike Fiers - controllable through 2020

Plus....
Joe Musgrove - controllable through 2023
Brad Peacock - controllable through 2021
Francis Martes - controllable through 2023

So the Astros have 8 starting pitching options next year, all of whom are controllable for at least two years.  This group of Astros starters have proven that they can prevent runs in line with the top rotations in baseball when healthy, despite being relatively unheralded and unsexy.  Or: this is a quietly good set of arms backed up by a great offense.  So I would argue that this was not the time to add a controllable starter to the Astros, because of a mix of their effectiveness and their contract status.  Particularly if it was going to cost a Forrest Whitley, a Franklin Perez or a J.B. Bukauskas.  And the other teams would come sniffing around, knowing that you probably had to cut a good arm lose next year.

Hey, I get that the Astros are a bit of a mess at the moment - like, in the last two weeks or so.  It isn't pretty watching them scramble with their pitching.  They can't seem to get a starter deep into the game, their key 'pen arms are either hurt, ineffective, or being rested for the postseason, and they don't have reliable lefty relief (until, perhaps, now).  Tyler White just threw an inning for goodness sake, and Nori Aoki did the same earlier in the season.  Francis Martes has just been lit up twice in a row after looking dominant for a while.  But the Opening Day Astros roster - you know, the team that leads the AL by 10.5 games - had two players who were Free Agents at the end of 2017.  One of them is 40 year-old Carlos Beltrán, the other just got traded to the Blue Jays.

This team isn't going going to be broken up at the end of this year.  All their key pieces are returning next year.  And the year after that.  And, mostly, the year after that.  This includes their pitching, who are a plenty solid group of starters.  The Astros' situation is quite unlike the situation that the Cubs and the Yankees are in, who face losing their number 2 and 3 starters in the offseason.  This simply wasn't the time to add a controllable starting pitcher, particularly one with a significant injury risk.

My next project will be to discuss options for playoff rotations, because I also think there are ways around that for the Astros.  Until then, thanks for reading.

Tuesday Morning Hot Links

*Jim Crane wants to bring in another starter to fill out the rotation behind Keuchel, McCullers, McHugh, Fiers, and Feldman but notes that long-term deals "don't seem to really pay off." So I guess the trick is to just draft the next big starter, huh?

*The Astros are interested in Yovani Gallardo, but he comes attached with a qualifying offer. The Orioles and Royals are also in on Gallardo, who might choose a new team soon. Drellich noted a few days ago that Gallardo was scouted and signed by Jim Stevenson, who also scouted Dallas Keuchel, and is now with the Astros.

*USA Today's Bob Nightengale says the Astros could be in play for Mike Leake, now that the Giants have signed Johnny Cueto.

*Ken Giles said all the right things during his press conference yesterday, as did A.J. Hinch, with both noting the price tag.
Giles:
They had to give up a lot to get me. That shows how much they want to take it to the next level and take that next step...I think they did a great job. I'm happy to be here and be sought out as an important piece for your organization.

Hinch isn't worried about crowning a closer in December:
I think they all buy in that they're going to have to be a collective group for us to get where we want to get. I'm no dummy. I understand we paid a lot to get Ken Giles. I understand how trade dynamics work. I understand the difference between 100-mph and 90-mph, but right now it's just nothing we need to address.

*NumberFire analyzes Giles and the trade.

*Here's Jayson Stark's excellent article on Pete Rose, who remains a complete and total idiot.

The Astros in May 2014: Starting Pitchers and Advanced Metrics.

In follow up to the earlier article, which involved going through the box scores of the Astros, Angels and White Sox games for the month of May, below are the per-start raw metrics for the three teams' starting rotation for the month of May.  These are averaged, and therefore potentially what could be expected on a per-start basis:

Houston Astros
IP: 6.27, H: 6.07, R: 2.76, ER: 2.41, BB: 1.79, K: 4.86, HR: 0.48,
Ground Balls: 8.62, Fly Balls: 5.14.
Game Score: 53.7.

Chicago White Sox
IP: 5.59, H: 6.11, R: 3.22, ER: 2.96, BB: 1.96, K: 4.26, HR: 0.77,
Ground Balls: 6.44, Fly Balls: 5.63.
Game Score: 47.4.

Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim 
IP: 6.25, H: 5.54, R: 2.96, ER: 2.68, BB: 2.07, K: 5.21, HR: 0.57,
Ground Balls: 7.03, Fly Balls: 6.32.
Game Score: 54.4.

The Astros' 0.2 R/ER difference over the Angels, and their 0.5 R/ER difference over the White Sox (and remember, this is per start, so the Sox are giving up more runs in fewer innings) is the most striking feature of the above results.  The more you dig, the more interesting this is.

Advanced metrics, as per Fangraphs, presented as a staff, but weighted for innings pitched, rather than averaged, Astros only:

Houston Astros
ERA- : 84.5
FIP- : 92.0
xFIP- : 92.9
FIP :  3.45
xFIP :  3.59
SEIRA :  3.62

(Remember that the Astros' ERA for May was 3.45)

Remember that ERA-, FIP- and xFIP- are all measured against 100, meaning that the Astros starters were better than league average pitching in all three measures - in the case of ERA-, they were 15.5% better than the league average,

FIP, xFIP and SEIRA are all designed to be measured in a similar way to ERA.  In this article on FIP, the FIP would be ranked between "Great" and "Above Average" on the explanatory table.  Remember, this is as a staff, so is a summation of all the pitchers together, weighted for innings pitched.  SEIRA is the most unfavourable toward the Astros starters, likely because of their high ground ball rates (on the premise that the ground balls go for hits more often than flyballs).  But, the Astros shift like crazy, and perhaps that makes a difference in having an ERA lower than SEIRA.  Be interesting to watch.

Digging deeper, it would be nice if some of these numbers were put into some context, however.  Lets try and find a pitcher from 2013 who has an ERA and advanced metrics closest to those above.

2013 Derek Holland had an ERA of 3.42, and FIP of 3.44, and xFIP of 3.68.  SEIRA was 3.74.  His ERA- was 81, and his FIP- was 82.  Not the worst match in the world.  Holland was worth 4.8 WAR for the 2013 season (he threw 213 innings), and was ranked 11th in baseball WAR.

The Astros May staff, as a population or group, is very similar to 2013 Derek Holland.  The 11th ranked pitcher in baseball.

And this is as far and I am going to dig (and the most interesting nugget of all): the Astros starters can be summed up (and compared with the Angels and the White Sox) by one single number.

Astros Starting Pitching WAR: 3.2.

The Angels' WAR: 3.0

The White Sox WAR: 1.6

Top AL score for starting pitching in May??

The Astros' 3.2.  Second is the Yankee starters' 3.1 WAR.

Can't wait for June.  Or, having read Cockroach's game recap, can't wait for June 2nd, more precisely.

From the Office of the County Clerk - G45: Astros v Angels

Dallas Keuchel (4-2, 2.84) versus Garrett Richards (4-0, 3.02)

aka: the Battle of the Surprise Starters in the AL.

Garrett Richards has been garnering some press recently as a guy who has a heap of talent, but who historically has had low strikeout rate that has been holding him back.  Some technical changes, and boom, he has managed a fast transition to one of the best starters in the minors AL (damn jet lag).

Dallas Keuchel has been noticed around these parts as an integral part of the Astros starting rotation.  He has garnished a little attention in the national press.  But because he plays for the dis-Astros, and because a control lefty who has throughly dominated three straight good offensive teams (including tonight, and I include Texas because of their injury difficulties) doesn't fit the "they suck" press narratives, he has done it all relatively anonymously.  Keuchel has reduced his walks and home-run rate, slightly increased his strikeouts (compared to 2013, but doubled it compared to 2012), and has kept the ball on the ground at an elite rate (circa-65%).

If you expected this to be a pitchers duel, then you would be mostly wrong.  The Astros scored three in the first, one in each of the next two, then held on to win 5-2 over an hot Angels team (8-2 in their last 10, coming in to tonight's game).


On the Bump:

Well,  I have kind of given the game away.  Dallas Keuchel is the whole story tonight, with another ridiculous performance.  He dominated a strong Angels lineup, neutering the RH power that Albert Pujols and Mike Trout brought to the table.

Keuchel was filthy-nasty again, with a final line not quite reflecting the level of dominance that he achieved: 8.2IP (128 pitches), 5H, 2R/ER, BB, 8K.  He kept the ball on the ground again (14:2), and enticed Angels hitters into two double-plays.

Keuchel's last three appearances (against the Tigers, Rangers and Angels): 25.1IP, 18H, 4R/ER, 1HR, 1BB (!!), 22K, 46 ground balls, 17 fly balls, 3 wins, 1.42 ERA.  Wow.  In case you missed it - 1 walk in 25-plus innings.

He narrowly, narrowly missed another complete-game shutout, allowing a two-out infield single to Mike Trout, who only just beat the throw to first.  Albert Pujols then singled off the glove of a diving Matt Dominguez at third (into the right-side shift), bringing Bo Porter out of the dugout for the switch.  Josh Zeid then got to 1-2 on Howie Kendrick before Kendrick tripled to the RF corner, scoring both runners.

Zeid then ended the game by enticing C.J. Cron into a groundout to third base.


At the Plate:

The Astros O jumped all over Garrett Richards early, threatening to knock him out of the game.  To his credit, however, Richards persevered, and saved his 'pen for the rest of the series.

The Astros scored in the first three innings, jumping out to a 5-0 lead after three.  Opening the game, Altuve doubled, followed by a Springer wild-pitch walk, a two-base throwing error (to third base), a Fowler walk, a Castro RBI single, a Dominguez RBI single, then a fly out and a double play.

In the second inning, an Altuve 2-out single, a Springer single, and a Fowler single scored another run.  Fowler got thrown out trying to stretch his hit into a double moment before Springer touched home plate, to restrict it to a one-run inning.

In the third inning, a Castro lead-off double was followed by a one-out Carter single.  Another Krauss double-play followed.

After that, the Astros managed two singles (Dominguez, Gonzalez) and one double play over the next  four, with Richards facing one over the minimum.  Hector Santiago finished for the Angels with two hitless innings, facing the minimum.

As a team, the Astros again managed double-digit (10) hits, and two walks, striking out only twice.  Four for seven with Runners-in-Scoring-Position, three LOBbies.


Turning Point:

Garrett Richards gave away more runs that he could afford in the first.  After giving up an Altuve double, then allowing him to advance to third on a full-count wild-pitch, Richards tried a pickoff move to third base that went horribly wrong.  The errant throw allowed Altuve to score, and Springer to advance two bases, where he would later score on a Castro single.

Thanks to Dallas Keuchel, the three runs that the Astros scored in the first is all they would need.


Man of the Match:

Dallas Keuchel reeled off another stunning start, neutering a potent Angels lineup.  Long may it last for the diminutive left-hander.


Goat of the Game:

If one were to use the retrospect-o-scope to assign a goat, then one could make an argument to give it to Bo Porter, who left Dallas Keuchel in the game, starting the ninth, at 107 pitches.  Personally, I would have pulled Keuchel with two outs in the ninth, after 116 pitches, thus accurately predicting that the next two batters would score to be the only two runners on Keuchel's line.

But, due to the beauty of today's win, no Goat!!

Astros County Roundtable: May 8

We at AC have decided to give any readers out there small a window into the inner-workings of the AC offices.  Once a week, we meet in the AC Boardroom, get Betty and Cynthia to hold all calls, and discuss pressing issues, such as who has been parking in the Constable's carpark, and why Batguy always orders a soy-latte with a Hazelnut shot.  We sometimes get to talking about baseball.  The results of the discussion for this week are below.

Pressing Issue:  Who gets ditched from the rotation once Scott Feldman gets back??

The Constable:  ... crickets...  (Still asleep after his marathon Out of the Park Baseball session.  World Series won in 2027!!)

Cockroach:  I was going to say that Peacock should be the easy choice, because Oberholtzer has been more consistently good, but then I fact-checked myself. Peacock has three Game Scores of 50 or higher in four starts this season, for an average of 48.2. Oberholtzer has four Game Scores of 50 or higher, but in seven starts, for an average of 43.7. Peacock also clearly outperformed Oberholtzer this week. That said, I still think it's Peacock who gets moved to the Goatpen (at least unless/until McHugh gets bombed again), because Oberholtzer has been in the rotation all season and I think he'll need to continue under-performing before he pitches himself out of that spot.

Batguy:  First, I think this all hinges on McHugh's next start. If it's like his last one, he's back in OKC. However, if he can show he still deserves a longer look, I think Peacock gets sent back to the bullpen. I know he has better numbers as a starter than a reliever this season but if you dig a little deeper I'm not sure that success is sustainable. His peripheral stats as a starter are nearly identical to what Lucas Harrell put up. As a matter of fact, Harrell's FIP was lower than Peacock's is as a starter right now. I really liked getting Peacock in the Lowrie trade, but in almost 120 innings in Houston he just can't seem to pull it together.

(Not Hank):  It will be really boring if we all agree, so I will say Oberholtzer. Peacock really must get his walks under control.

Masked:  I think this is an interesting one, and I think we need to be prepared for a surprise.  I think that Obie gets mailed back to OKC for a few weeks to work on his control.  As a 24 year-old soft-tossing lefty, he relies on impeccable control, and this year it hasn't quite been there with his fastball (0.4 vrs -10.9 fastball runs above average).  Fangraphs also thinks that he is not throwing a slider this year, but that his knuckle curve and change up have both improved.  I think he works on his knuckle-curve command and two-seamer again in OKC, while keeping his inning totals down so that he can go the whole year (166.2 is his highest inning total, so I imagine he would be restricted to 180-190 combined IP this year).  This would be a move with an eye to the longer-term.  Then, if McHugh gets shelled over the next month, Obie is back up.

But, in making an argument for Obie being sent down, I also probably have to make an argument to keep Brad Peacock in the rotation.  Peacock is 26, so his time is now, and he already started the year in the 'pen.  His last few starts, including last nights have been quite interesting - he got burned by some pretty good hitting.  His pitch values are in line with his career norms, so he has nothing to work on other than his walks.  His velocity may be a little down (he was throwing 90-91 last night, normally sits at 92-93), so that bears watching.  I think he stays for now.

Stay tuned for the minutes of the next weeks meeting.

Update:  Obie has, apparently, been optioned

Data from One Month of the Astros Starting Rotation

Those of you who follow the Astros are doubtless aware of the narrative to this point of the season.  It goes something like this:

• The bullpen is awful, and has blown a bunch of leads
• The offence is under performing, but is due for a luck-related correction

The Astros are also projected to have the worst rotation in baseball (narrowly beating out "free agents").  Worth examining whether that is the case.

I thought that I would look into the starting rotation thus far.  The Batguy recently published an article recently on how many at-bats, plate-appearances or batters-faced are needed before various statistics stabilise.  The stabilisation points for pitchers range from 70 batters-faced (strikeouts) to 1450 batters-faced (extra base-hits).

For comparisons sake, Jarred Cosart has faced 133 batters thus far in the 2014 season, and Dallas Keuchel has faced 126 batters.  Cosart has faced 379 batters in his career, and Keuchel has faced 1185 batters, so it is early days for the career stats of the vast majority of the 2014 rotation, Feldman excepted.

Personally, I like what the the Astros have done with the total rebuild.  The tear-down is complete, and the phase of the rebuild has moved on to giving young players time on the park, and seeing who is worth keeping, and who isn't.  I much prefer this strategy than the moves the Astros made earlier in my fandom, such as dropping 9 figures on Carlos Lee (when no one else was really bidding on him), trading for Jason Jennings, signing the corpse of Woody Williams, and so on and so forth (Miggy Tejada, anyone?)

Many pundits indicate a preference to build around a starting rotation.  The Cardinals have done that, and people seem to think that the Luhnow connection means that the Astros will be like the Cards in a few years time.  And the Cards have a solid front-five, and a bullpen jam-packed full of future starters, and the Astros seem to have a bunch of interesting arms at all levels of the minors.

Now that the season is 28 games old, 17% of the season has passed.  From the perspective of analysing the trends of the rotations (as opposed to individuals), things are starting to become clear.

For this article, I was interested in looking at how the Astros rotation has pitched compared to two other randomly selected AL rotations.  I went through each start for each team, and recorded how the starting pitcher did.  The blinded comparison is below:

Team A: 149 IP, 166H, 85R, 72ER, 68BB, 135K (1.98K/BB), 1.14 GB/FB ratio
               15 Quality Starts, 5 Disaster Starts, 9 wins, 9 losses
               4.40 ERA, 5.1 RA/9, 1.57 WHIP

Team B: 157 IP, 146H, 79R, 75ER, 66BB, 126K (1.90K/BB), 1.70 GB/FB ratio
               13 Quality Starts, 6 Disaster Starts, 7 wins, 13 losses.
               4.28 ERA, 4.52 RA/9, 1.34 WHIP

Team C: 156 IP, 143H, 68R, 53ER, 42BB, 127K (3.02K/BB), 1.21GB/FB ratio
               14 Quality Starts, 3 Disaster Starts, 10 wins, 6 losses.
               3.05 ERA, 3.92 RA/9, 1.18 WHIP

(A Disaster Start is defined as <5IP, 4 or more earned or unearned runs given up, just for kicks)

I am guessing that most of you have an idea which team the Astros are.

For Team A, if the starter threw a QS, the pitchers' W-L record was 8-3
For Team B, if the starter threw a QS, the pitchers' W-L record was 6-1
For Team C, if the starter threw a QS, the pitchers' W-L record was 9-1

Team A seems to value attacking the strike zone, giving up the most hits of the three teams, but also striking out the most.  This team also gets the most fly-balls.

Team B seems to value ground balls, and has been pretty reasonable at run prevention.  They still strike guys out at a reasonable clip.

Team C's starters are having a great season, preventing runs by limiting walks.  They have the best WHIP, but have given up roughly the same number of hits as Team B.  The unearned runs are significant here too.

Team A is the Boston Red Sox, the reigning World Series champs.  Team B is your Houston Astros.  Team C is the surprising Kansas City Royals.  I chose the Royals because they filled roughly 60% of their rotation with veteran retreads - the tactic that some commentators advocated for the Astros for this season.

Of course, Team B's statistics contain the buxom 9.49 ERA of Lucas Harrell.  If we were to exclude Harrell's starts, then we get:

Houston Astros: 145 IP, 127H, 65R, 62ER, 57BB, 117K (2.05 K/BB), 1.66 GB/FB ratio
                           13 Quality Starts, 3 Disaster Starts, 7 wins, 10 losses.
                           3.84 ERA, 4.03 RA/9, 1.27 WHIP

Now you can't go around selecting which starters or starts you want to analyse - you are dealing with a population, and picking and choosing out of that population introduces bias.  Which makes the findings largely irrelevant.  However, Lucas Harrell is not going to pitch again for the Astros this year (or - probably - any year), so potentially taking the time to look at the statistics in this light could be useful.

So, if we remove all the starts of the pitcher from each team with the most Disaster Starts (which is the case with Lucas Harrell), we get:

Boston Red Sox: 125 IP, 136H, 65R, 56ER, 57BB, 119K (2.08K/BB), 1.07 GB/FB ratio
                            13 Quality Starts, 3 Disaster Starts, 8 wins, 6 losses
                            4.00 ERA, 4.7 RA/9, 1.54 WHIP

Kansas City Royals: 137 IP, 115H, 52R, 37ER, 35BB, 109K (3.11K/BB), 1.26GB/FB ratio
                                 14 Quality Starts, 1 Disaster Starts, 9 wins, 4 losses.
                                 2.43 ERA, 3.42 RA/9, 1.09 WHIP

The pitchers excluded are Felix Dubront and Bruce Chen.  Both pitchers have had non-disaster starts, unlike Harrell.  Both pitchers have reputations as streaky lefties.

When looking at the Astros' starting rotation compared with the other two ball clubs, the ground-ball to fly-ball ratio really stands out.  I think that this is closely correlated to to the number and frequency of shifts that the Astros are employing.  But interestingly, the Astros' defence has been commented on recently as being poor and lacking range.  Let's quickly look at the infield, via Fangraphs admittedly imperfect defensive ratings:

Marc Krauss: -2.1 runs saved
Jesus Guzman: -0.5 runs saved
Jose Altuve: -2.6 runs saved
Jonathan Villar: -0.3 runs saved
Matt Dominguez: -0.2 runs saved

More Ground-Balls into an elite defence would be a formula that a pitching staff would definitely be interested in, so it is interesting to note that the current Astros defence has not been assessed as being helpful thus far.

Finally, as a whimsical fantasy, I decided to couple the Astros' starting pitcher performance (with Harrell) with a hypothetical league-average offence.  The Astros are currently scoring a svelte 3.14 runs per game, giving a pythagorean projected season standing of 53 wins over a full season, or 9 wins after 28 games.

Coupling the Astros starters to a league average offence (4.42 runs per game to this point in the season) gives a pythagorean record of 79 wins over a full season, or 14 wins after 28 games.

This confirms what we already know: the Astros starters are not the reason that this team sits at 9-19.  We also know that the Astros are a GB orientated team, and they are certainly putting that into effect this early in the season.  With the offence and the Goatpen both likely to improve (I mean, how could it get worse!), the starters would be hopeful that their solid work to this point will be more obvious as the season progresses.