The Season That Was, Part 1

I believe you can divide up the 2016 season into four distinct parts. Today we'll look at the first of those eras: Opening Day-May 2.

We should have seen it coming. We were basically given the script for how the season would go on the first day of the season. No, not the first game of the season - a 5-3 win over the Yankees - but the first day. Opening Day should have been Monday, April 4, but because of cold and sleet the opener was delayed until the next day. An off-season full of expectations about how wonderful and magical could be, the (somewhat controversial) acquisition of Ken Giles, a full season out of Carlos Correa, Lance McCullers, the reigning Cy Young champ looking for an encore, the best hitter in the game playing another season. Coming off a post-season run that felt more like a beginning than a missed opportunity, we as fans were ready to go. Five long months of just waiting for Opening Day and then? Gotta wait another 24 hours.

Were there questions? Sure there were. I don't think anyone expected Colby Rasmus to become the first player to accept a qualifying offer. Did that $15.8m limit the Astros in any other way? Who's to say? Could you expect a reasonable follow-up from Collin McHugh? How would Tyler White do at 1B?

That 1-0 record would very quickly turn to 3-7 after the first ten games as the Astros simply could not get their offense going and by the time A.J. Hinch made a significant change (more on that in the next post) the Astros would be 8-18, seven games back after 26 games.

So what happened? After 26 games the Astros were hitting .227/.312/.405 or, roughly, a team with offensive production like Adam Lind. They struck out almost ten times a game - 257 strikeouts to 98 walks. The early 2016 Astros hit 32 home runs in their first 26 games (10 in the first five games of 2016), but 22 of those homers were solo shots highlighting the season-long issue of getting a "clutch" hit or homer. You can live by the homer, but if you live by the solo shot you will find yourself dying very quickly.

With nobody on base Astros batters hit .233/.318/.432, and struck out in 29.6% of ABs. With runners on base they hit .218/.303/.366, and struck out in 31.1% of ABs. With two outs and runners in scoring position (102 plate appearances), they hit .129/.206/.290, striking out to end the inning 36 times. Whichever way you look at it, they struck out a lot but couldn't overcome it with clustered hits and runs.

In this first period of the season the Astros were only scoring 3.6 runs a game. They scored three or fewer runs in 13 of these first 26 games (2-11). The other problem is that, those other 13 games where the Astros scored 4+ runs? They went 6-7. A 16-6 loss to the Yankees in G2, two 7-5 losses. It stacked up. Snowballed.

So who struggled early? Not Altuve, of course, he was hitting .301/.395/.621. This was the era of Good King Rasmus, too - hitting .241/.369/.530 with seven homers, 26K:18BB. Springer was doing fairly well: .269/.333/.471. Correa? .258/.383/.416 - which is fine, but not quite what any of us were expecting, but still...he's 22. Everyone else? Brutal.

Tyler White: .235/.304/.469 (remember his Ruthian first week of the season?)
Evan Gattis: .216/.281/.353
Carlos Gomez: .212/.241/.275
Preston Tucker: .200/.241/.436
Marwin Gonzalez: .196/.241/.333
Luis Valbuena: .180/.296/.246
Jason Castro: .175/.299/.263

Folks let me give you some #hot #analysis: this is bad. The bottom half of the lineup couldn't hit - Valbuena and Castro both had a higher OBP than SLG. The #5 spot (mainly Gomez) and the #8 and #9 spots were hitting under .180. When a third of your lineup has 101 strikeouts in 259 at-bats and OPS's under .550.../throws computer.

Pitching? Yeah, let's talk about that.

In the first 26 games the pitching staff as a whole had a 4.85 ERA/1.44 WHIP. The starting pitcher had a Game Score of 60+ just five times (and still lost one of those games). Conversely, the starter had a Game Score of 30 or lower six times. The Astros allowed 5+ runs in 11 of their first 26 games and didn't win a single one of those.

Overall they allowed a line of .281/.333/.467...an .800 OPS-against. With the bases empty, Astros pitchers allowed a .280/.326/.461 line. With runners on, Astros pitchers allowed a .283/.343/.476 line. Consistently not good.

There were basically three reliable pitchers in the first 26 games, and they were all relievers: Luke Gregerson (10IP, 1.80 ERA/0.70 WHIP), Chris Devenski (18.2IP, 1.45 ERA/1.07 WHIP) and Will Harris (11.2IP, 0.77 ERA/0.77 WHIP). The rotation was brutal, and also inverted. They were getting better results from the bottom of the rotation than the top:

Keuchel: 37IP, 5.11 ERA/1.57 WHIP
McHugh: 21.2IP, 6.65 ERA/1.89 WHIP
Fiers: 29IP, 4.97 ERA/1.28 WHIP
Fister: 29.1IP, 4.60 ERA/1.43 WHIP
Feldman: 22.2IP, 3.97 ERA/1.63 WHIP

Of course McHugh had that 16-6 loss charged to him in G2, skewing his numbers. Two of Keuchel's first three starts were gems: The Opening Day win, and eight scoreless innings at Detroit (which the Astros won, 1-0). Otherwise he was meh.

Eight pitchers - EIGHT - allowed a .500 SLG or higher through those first 26 games: McHugh (.571), Giles (.612), Feliz (.588), Fields (.543), Fiers (.526), Feldman (.500), Sipp (.583), Neshek (.542).

They were 4-11 on the road, and 4-7 at home. Pitching struggled. Hitting struggled. Everything was a struggle, and that struggle was very real.

Evidence of Witchcraft: 2016 Astros/Rangers edition

The Astros finished the season series against the Rangers 4-15, which is unbelievable. Let's take a closer look inside the numbers. 

First, a recap. Over the past four years - since the Astros joined the AL - the Rangers are 53-23 against the Astros. 

Astros record vs. Rangers:

2013: 2-17

2014: 11-8

2015: 6-13

2016: 4-15

No idea what happened in 2014.

But since this is about 2016...Overall in 2016, Astros batters have hit: .246/.321/.422 with a 2.58 K:BB ratio on a .298 BABIP. Against the 2016 Rangers, Astros batters hit: .219/.297/.365 with 164K:64BB (2.56 K:BB) on a .267 BABIP.

The culprits: 

George Springer: .165/.267/.342, 27K:10BB

Carlos Correa: .159/.266/.188, 16K:10BB

Jason Castro: .179/.273/.333, 15K:5BB

Marwin Gonzalez: .224/.224/.347, 13K:0BB

Tyler White: .184/.225/.342, 7K:2BB

The Rangers own Springer and Correa. And when two of your top three hitters can't hit against a team, you're going to lose some games.

Pitchers:

Collin McHugh: 8IP, 14H/9ER, 9K:3BB, 10.12 ERA/2.12 WHIP

Dallas Keuchel: 28.1IP, 35H/17ER, 26K:3BB, 5.40 ERA/1.34 WHIP

Doug Fister: 26.2IP, 37H/14ER, 11K:9BB, 4.72 ERA/1.73 WHIP

Joe Musgrove: 17.2IP, 18H/9ER, 16K:4BB, 4.58 ERA/1.25 WHIP

Mike Fiers: 12.1IP, 14H/6ER, 8K:1BB, 4.38 ERA/1.22 WHIP

Everyone knows that the Rangers lineup is strong top-to-bottom and it doesn't matter who is pitching for the Astros, no starter is going to fare terribly well.

But we all know the real culprit for the Rangers' dominance is witchery. Let's look at the individual series in 2016:

April 19-21, at Dallas: 0-3, 10 runs scored / 16 against

May 20-22, at Houston: 0-3, 4 runs scored / 13 against
June 6-9, at Dallas: 1-3, 14 runs scored / 16 against
August 5-7, at Houston: 1-2, 10 runs scored / 8 against
September 2-4, at Ft Worth: 1-2, 19 runs scored / 28 against
September 12-14, at Houston: 1-2, 13 runs scored / 11 against

In two of these series the Astros were a combined 2-4, outscoring the Rangers 23-19. In 1-run games the Rangers went 8-1. In games where the margin of victory was 1-2 runs the Rangers went 12-2. The Rangers scored 5+ runs in nine games. The Astros scored 5+ runs in six games. But in those six games in which the Astros scored 5+ runs, they went 3-3. When the Rangers scored 5+ runs they went 8-1. This is simply unreal. Witchery.

So let's rank the 15 losses on a scale of evidence of Witchery:

One Witch: June 9, 5-3 Rangers
One night after the Astros beat the Rangers for the first time in 2016, the Rangers were up to their old tricks. The Astros scored two runs in the top of the 3rd, but the Rangers answered with three in the bottom half and then added one in the 4th. The Astros got one in the top of the 7th to cut it to 4-3, but the Rangers scored in the bottom of the 8th.

A bad Collin McHugh start is not evidence of Witchery. Collin McHugh failed to make it out of the 4th, with 7H/4ER, 6K:1BB. Here was his 3rd inning, after retiring the first six batters: Walk, double, single, single, strikeout, single, strikeout, strikeout. In the 4th he allowed a leadoff homer to Prince Fielder (RIP), flyball, double, strikeout, single and was pulled before getting to face Desmond with runners on the corners.

Two Witches: September 3, 12-4 Rangers
The Astros again took a 1-0 lead in the top of the 2nd, gave it back in the bottom of the inning and then the Rangers scored two in the 4th, two in the 5th, two in the 7th, five in the 8th (off Brady Rodgers in his MLB debut). No one could pitch effectively.

This was in the stretch where the starters couldn't make it through the fifth inning, setting up the mid- to late-September collapse when the bullpen was gassed. The Rangers steamrolling through the pitching staff, and putting up five on a guy making his debut is not evidence of witchery.

Three Witches: May 22, 9-2 Rangers
The Rangers scored five runs in the top of the 3rd and the Astros couldn't come close to recovering. Altuve/Springer/Correa went a combined 0x11 with 5K:1BB.

Another Cole Hamels gem against the Astros, another Dallas Keuchel disaster. Keuchel allowed 9H/7ER, 6K:1BB in 6IP. Neshek allowed two runs of his own. Here's Keuchel's 5-run 3rd inning: HBP, Double, Strikeout, Strikeout, Single, Passed Ball, Walk, Double, Single, Strikeout. The ugliest side-striking-out I've seen in a while.

Four Witches: April 21, 7-4 Rangers
The Astros took an early 1-0 lead in the top of the first, and then the Rangers answered with three in the bottom half and added a run in the 2nd and 3rd. Dallas Keuchel's day ended with 6IP, 13H/6ER, 5K:0BB.

The Astros went 1x6 w/RISP, meaning that the first series ended with the Astros going 5x30 w/RISP. Colby Rasmus hit two homers. This was perhaps the first point at which we wondered if Dallas Keuchel had accidentally had relations with a witch in the offseason, setting him up for a terrible post-Cy Young season.

Five Witches: April 19, 7-5 Rangers:
The Astros never had the lead. The Rangers scored three in the bottom of the 1st, the Astros answered with two in the top of the 2nd but the Rangers scored three unanswered runs. The Astros did get two in the top of the 7th (the Rangers got one back in the bottom half) and one in the 9th, but the Rangers scored often enough.

The Astros were 2x12 w/RISP. Josh Fields allowed the first four batters he faced in the 6th to reach base. In the 6th, Tyler White hit a leadoff double, but couldn't get him in.

Six Witches: September 2, 10-8 Rangers
Wow this game was stupid. The Astros took a 2-0 lead in the 1st. The Rangers scored seven runs in the bottom of the 4th inning to give them a 9-2 lead. The Astros fought back with three in the 7th, two in the 8th...but...you know the drill.

The Rangers got their first two runs (and the margin of victory) in the 2nd on a throwing error. And I haven't looked too closely (yet) but this was Peak Fister. Here's his 4th inning: Single, Single, Double, Sac Fly, Groundout, Home run, Walk, Home run. Michael Feliz came in and gave up a home run to Lucroy. 9-2. Then he walked in a run in the 5th (an inning in which he walked three batters). The Astros scored eight runs on seven hits and six walks. But Fister's/Feliz's problems couldn't be overcome. This game rated this highly because it was Carlos Gomez's first game against the Astros since getting DFAd and he went 2x3 with a double, walk and three runs scored, raising his season OPS by 12 points in a single game.

Seven Witches: May 20, 2-1 Rangers
The Rangers scored two in the top of the 3rd. The Astros answered with one in the bottom of the 9th, but couldn't get the tying run. This was the 2nd loss in which the Astros out-hit the Rangers - this time it was 7-6 in favor of the Astros.

Colby Lewis dominated, throwing 7IP, 4H/0ER, 6K:0BB. In the 4th, the Astros had Correa on 2nd with one out and couldn't bring him home. Altuve doubled to lead off the 9th, but two groundouts by Springer and Correa brought up Rasmus, who singled him home. Evan Gattis struck out to end the game. The Astros had five 1-2-3 innings.

Eight Witches: April 20, 2-1 Rangers:
The Rangers scored two runs in the bottom of the 2nd, and that was it. The Astros scratched one across in the 6th, but couldn't get the tying run in.

The Astros' early-season RISP struggles continued as they follow up the 2x12 with a 1x12 on the 20th. Cole Hamels hit the first two batters he faced, but a strikeout followed by a strikeout/throwout ended that inning. In the top of the 2nd the Astros loaded the bases with nobody out but Marwin's flyout to right wasn't deep enough to allow Rasmus to score. Jason Castro grounded out to end the inning. Correa doubled to right to lead off the 8th inning but the Astros folololololwed that up with a groundout, strikeout looking, strikeout looking to end the threat.

Nine Witches: June 7, 4-3 Rangers
The Astros and Rangers were tied 2-2 heading into the bottom of the 8th. Rangers scored two in the bottom half, Astros got one in the top of the 9th, but couldn't get any more.

Springer/Altuve/Correa/Gattis combine for an 0x13, 4K:3BB day. Dallas Keuchel was inexplicably sent back out for the 8th inning and promptly allowed a 2-run Ian Desmond homer. And once again, Cole Hamels outshines Keuchel. Springer had runners on 1st and 2nd with two outs in the 5th and grounded out to end the inning. Rasmus led off the 9th inning with a double and Carlos Gomez drew a (gasp!) walk. Luis Valbuena singled in Rasmus and sent Gomez to third base with one out. Sam Dyson - the Gingerbeard Man - struck out Tony Kemp and George Springer to end the game.

Ten Witches: May 21, 2-1 Rangers
Love those 1-run losses! The Rangers scored one in the 2nd and one in the 3rd. The Astros got one back in the 3rd, and then got nothing as they were out-hit 6-3.

Cesar Ramos retired the first six Astros batters, allowed a Marwin homer, and then faced the minimum 12 batters over the next four innings. Tyler White grounded out to end the 7th inning with Gattis on third. The next six Astros were set down in order to end the game. It ranks so highly on the Witch Factor because Cesar Ramos has only started 14 games in an 8-year career, and this day's 67 Game Score was the highest of them all. His 2016 season ended in July with a 6.04 ERA.

Eleven Witches: June 6, 6-5 Rangers
The Rangers scored three in the bottom of the 1st, the Astros answered with an Altuve 3-run homer in the top of the 3rd. It went back and forth with the game tied 5-5 heading into the bottom of the 9th. Giles got Ian Desmond swinging for the first out, allowed a liner to left by Mazara, got a fielder's choice to force Mazara at 2nd before GD Rougned F. Odor doubled to deep left to end the game.

The Astros had Gattis on third in the top of the 2nd but a Gomez strikeout and a Marwin double play ended the threat. Then the Astros had the bases loaded in the top of the 6th, tied 4-4, before Springer popped up to short and Altuve popped up to 2nd, scoring a grand total of Zero runs. Beltre was able to beat out the throw to 1st in the bottom of the 9th to even allow Odor to end the game.

Twelve Witches: August 7, 5-3 Rangers (11 innings)
This one hurt. The Astros were down 3-0 heading into the bottom of the 8th, got two in that inning, tied it up in the bottom of the 9th...before the Rangers got two in the top of the 11th to win the game. Daggum Rougned Odor had three hits. Desmond, Profar, Beltre, Lucroy, and Moreland all had two hits.

Joe Musgrove goes 7IP, 5H/1ER, 6K:0BB. Will Harris comes in for the 8th and walks Delino DeShields (Delino DeShields!) then hits Shin-Soo Choo. DeShields stole third and was then thrown out at home on a fielder's choice from Altuve. In came Giles, who gave up a two-run double on the 2nd pitch of the AB. Evan Gattis left Correa at 2B in the bottom of the 8th. Tony Kemp - who had three hits after coming in as a pinch-hitter and staying as a defensive replacement - scored Carlos Gomez, who had pinch-run for A.J. Reed - to tie the game. Pat Neshek loaded the bases with one out in the 10th but wriggled out of it. Devenski allowed a double, single, single, foul out, double to put the game just out of reach in the 11th. Springer couldn't deliver with Marisnick on third base. To fight back like that and lose in extras? Typical.

Thirteen Witches: August 6, 3-2 Rangers
 The Astros had a 1-0 lead going into the 6th, but gave up a single run in each of the next three innings to go down 3-1. A run in the bottom of the 9th made it 3-2, but Marwin couldn't get Bregman across, ensuring yet another 1-run loss to the Rangers.

This gets 13 Witches because of the Rangers' starting pitcher. He didn't last long enough to qualify for the win (3.2IP) but the Rangers beat the Astros in a game they started Lucas Harrell. Doug Fister pitched well-ish (6IP, 9H/1ER, 2K:2BB) but Devenski gave up a rare run. Tony Sipp gave up a not-so-rare run.

Fourteen Witches: September 12, 4-3 Rangers (12 innings)
The Rangers had a 3-1 lead going into the bottom of the 7th when the Astros got one back, then tied it in the bottom of the 9th. The Rangers got the go-ahead run in the top of the 12th and of course the Astros couldn't overcome it.

The Astros hit into four double plays and were caught stealing twice. Gattis hit the game-tying homer in the 9th, but Roughed Odor accounted for three of the Rangers' four runs, including a broken-bat RBI single in which the barrel of the bat went farther than the ball did, as well as the 12th inning go-ahead homer off James Hoyt. But the biggest witchery came in the 7th, when Tony Kemp hit a ball to deep right field with two men on. Marwin came around to score and Rasmus was hustling from 1st, but the ball bounced over the wall, stranding Rasmus at 3rd and Kemp at 2nd. Rasmus surely would have scored to tie the game there. But with runners on 2nd/3rd with two outs, Springer predictably struck out swinging.

Fifteen Witches: September 13, 3-2 Rangers
Finally: Proof that witchcraft exists, and that the Rangers channel the dark lord to win games against the Astros. The Astros had a 2-1 lead going into the 9th, but the most typical/unbelievable series of events transpired to give the Rangers the 3-2 win.

The Astros had a 2-1 lead in a game in which they did not have a single at-bat with a runner in scoring position - both runs came on solo homers from Altuve and Castro. Brad Peacock went full Brandon Backe with 6IP, 3H/1ER, 5K:2BB. Harris and Gregerson threw scoreless innings, and in came Ken Giles. He got Beltre to ground out to short for the first out. He got Odor to strikeout swinging, but the ball got away from Castro and Odor made it to first before the throw could get him. Odor stole 2nd. Mitch Moreland struck out - the third out of the inning. Elvis Andrus tripled to score Odor, tying the game. Profar hit a single to left to score Andrus and give the Rangers the lead. The shell-shocked Astros only saw 10 pitches in the bottom of the 9th to finish the game. And this happened one day after the Fourteen Witches game?! The Rangers went to the clubhouse to sacrifice animals in order to uphold their end of the bargain. 

Tuesday Morning Hot Links

The playoffs start tonight.

*Five years into the Jeff Luhnow Era, Brian T. Smith writes that it's time for the Astros to start thinking bigger.

*A.J. Hinch ain't happy with 84-78. Hinch:
I'm not handling it very well at all, to be honest. I hate losing. I don't like being here and having this meeting when I know there's a game being played tomorrow, but I'm proud of the fact that 84 wins isn't good enough. I'm proud of the fact where the standards have been raised in two years since I've been here to have those emotions. 

*Brian McTaggart has a good breakdown of what happened in 2016.

*The Astros announced that they'll retain their entire coaching staff for 2017. Yes, the hitting coach, too.

*Jeff Luhnow said yesterday that he would have approached the trade deadline differently had he known they'd lose Keuchel and McCullers. Luhnow:
I can't control what happened after the deadline. But we're certainly going to continue to look at every opportunity going forward to give ourselves maybe a little more breathing room so if we do lose a player or we have some underperformance, that we've got more of a margin to still have a successful campaign. 

*Luhnow doesn't agree with the conventional wisdom that this year's free agent class is weak. Luhnow:
We're going to explore all avenues, and I think there's more quality free agents in this class than it's being given credit for at this time. There's going to be some really good signings, so we want to make sure we participate in those. 

*Luhnow is looking for a "Corey Kluber-type" rebound from Dallas Keuchel in 2017. And that he's not sure "if or how" Colby Rasmus fits into the Astros' 2017 plans (he doesn't).

*The Lancaster JetHawks have formally announced a Player Development Contract with the Colorado Rockies, meaning the Astros need to find themselves a High-A team - most likely in the Carolina League.

Breaking Down the September Schedules

Now that we have reached September 1 I guess it's okay to actually start to break down the potential Wild Card contenders. The Rangers are going to the playoffs barring some historic/hysterical/please-God-let-this-happen collapse, but I included them just so you could see what the Astros are up against. Not included are teams below the Astros in the Wild Card standings, even though the Yankees and Mariners and Royals are all pretty close. 

Houston Astros (71-62, 8.5 GB of Texas, 1.0 GB of WC2)

Remaining Schedule: @ Texas, @ Cleveland, vs Cubs, vs Texas, @ Seattle, @ Oakland, vs Anaheim, vs Seattle, @ Anaheim

13 at home (.574 win%)

16 on the road (.492 win%)

Record vs remaining teams: 33-24 (.579)

Record of remaining teams: 425-372 (.533)

Most of these wins come at the hands of the Angels and A’s. This next stretch is brutal and the postseason will likely be decided in the next 12 days with two series against the Ramgers, who have won 11 of 13 against the Astros plus four at Cleveland. If the Astros can at least stay afloat until the end of the second Texas series – and not get swept by the Rangers – the Astros can try to take advantage of the rest of the AL West. After the Rangers series from September 12-14, the Astros have their last 16 games against the Mariners, A’s, and Angels – against whom the Astros are a combined 29-12.

FanGraphs’ Projected Rest of Season Record: 15-14

Texas Rangers (80-54)

Remaining Schedule: Vs Houston, @ Seattle, @ Anaheim, @ Houston, vs Oakland, vs Angels, @ Oakland, vs Milwaukee, @ Tampa Bay

15 at home (.682 win%)

13 on the road (.515 win%)

Record vs remaining teams: 36-21 (.632)

Record of remaining teams: 368-429 (.462)

If the Rangers go 14-14, the Astros would need to go 23-6 to win the division.

FanGraphs’ Projected Rest of Season Record: 15-13

Boston Red Sox (74-59, 2.0 up for WC1)

Remaining Schedule: @ Oakland, @ San Diego, @ Toronto, vs Baltimore, vs New York, 

@ Baltimore, @ Tampa Bay, @ New York, vs Toronto

10 at home (.577 win%)

19 on the road (.532 win%)

Record vs remaining teams: 31-25 (.553)

Record of remaining teams: 385-410 (.484)

The Red Sox next stretch – against the A’s and San Diego – are favorable for them, and they have three series against teams who are currently 20 games below .500. But they do have 19 of their remaining 29 games on the road as well as 13 games remaining against the Blue Jays and Orioles. Collectively they’re 28-25 against the other AL East teams.

FanGraphs’ Projected Rest of Season Record: 17-12

Detroit Tigers (72-61, tied for WC2)

@ Kansas City, @ Chicago White Sox, vs Baltimore, vs Minnesota, @ Cleveland, @ Minnesota, vs Kansas City, vs Cleveland, @ Atlanta

14 at home (.582 win%)

15 on the road (.500 win%)

Record vs Remaining Teams: 27-20 (.574)

Record of Remaining Teams: 379-417 (.476)

FanGraphs’ Projected Rest of Season Record: 15-14

The Tigers get two series with Minnesota, whom they’ve beaten ten of 12 times…but they also have two series against Cleveland, who has beaten them in 11 of 12 games. The Tigers have been great at home, .500 on the road – maybe that’s the tipping point for them. Ultimately getting three series against the two worst teams in baseball may be enough to push them into October. 

Baltimore Orioles (72-61, tied for WC2)

Vs New York, @ Tampa Bay, @ Detroit, @ Boston, vs Tampa Bay, vs Boston, vs Arizona, 

@ Toronto, @ New York.

14 at home (.642 win%)

15 on the road (.439 win%)

Record vs Remaining Teams: 31-26 (.544)

Record of Remaining Teams: 403-393 (.506)

Baltimore has a nine-game road trip starting on Labor Day and a six-game road trip (at Toronto and New York) to end the season. They have been fantastic at Camden Yards, going 43-24, but have struggled on the road. How they manage those two road trips will determine if they play into the first week of October.

FanGraphs’ Projected Rest of Season Record: 15-14 

Takeaways

*The FanGraphs' Projected Rest of Season Record is sort of useless to me because they're saying every team in baseball will be within six games of each other over the last month of the season. 

*The Astros' chances look bleak, I'm not going to lie. They have not shown an ability to beat the Rangers in over a year, much less on the road, and that doesn't take into account having to play the Cubs and Indians while other teams get Minnesota and Atlanta. I'm not saying it's unfair, but it's how it's stacked at this point. The Astros have to play the toughest schedule among the teams ahead of them over the last month of the 2016 season. And let's not forget that the Astros' 33 wins against teams at or over .500 is 2nd-lowest in the American League. The Astros have six series remaining against teams currently over .500. 

*Screw it. Play the games and let's see what happens. Meaningful baseball in September? Sounds good to me. 

2016 Astros Trade Deadline: Review of the 2015 Trade Deadline Trades

Trade Deadlines are always interesting, moreso for a team like the Astros.  The Astros have a solid big-league product in 2016, with a potential superstar core that is projected to improve with age and experience.  They have solid right-handed power hitters in defensively important positions, some decent accessory players, and a solid bullpen.  The starting pitching has been much been better over the last two months, which co-incides with their league-best record since May 24.  They lack a glaring weakness (aside from, perhaps, lefty relief) with which to recruit to, and have a farm system that is well set up to replace the players they will lose in Free Agency this year, with the exception of the catching corps.  That is, unless readers believe that Evan Gattis is an everyday player, or Max Stassi, who continues to spin his wheels at AAA (.210/.268/.420) is big-league ready.

History can be a pretty useful guide when predicting what the Astros may do at the 2016 trade deadline.  We don't have a lot of history to go on, because the Astros have been good for exactly one season under the leadership of the current front office, but their work in 2015 is interesting, and does warrant a mention.

If we rewind to the 2015 season, the corresponding time last year was one where the Astros had ridden an early-season hot streak to a big division lead and were slowly getting reeled in by the Ramgers.  They had the clear need for an outfield bat, but not necessarily in CF as Colby Rasmus and George Springer could fake it in there without looking too bad.  The Astros possessed enough infield options to ride the hot hand, with interesting guys like MarGo, Chris Carter, Jonathan Villar and Jed Lowrie (who had recently returned from the DL around this time) all able to rotate through multiple positions.  Lefty relief was not a problem, as Tony Sipp was in the midst of a great season (1.99 ERA, 2.93 FIP).  Starting pitching depth was a clear area of need, because the Astros had to rely on luminaries such as Roberto Hernandez and Brett Oberholtzer through the first two months of the season - at least until Lance McCullers arrived and settled in.  Scott Feldman's health is never something to bank on, so the Astros clearly needed some assistance in the rotation.

So the Astros made two trades to address these needs:

• July 23: Scott Kazmir was acquired from the Oakland Athletics.  RHP Daniel Mengden and C/DH Jacob Nottingham went to the A's in return.  Kazmir was to become a free agent at the end of the 2015 season.
• July 30: Carlos Gómez and Mike Fiers were acquired from the Milwaukee Brewers.  CF Brett Phillips, OF Domingo Santana, LHP Josh Hader and RHP Adrian Houser were traded to the Brewers in return.  Gómez is due to become a free agent at the end of the 2016 season, whereas Mike Fiers cannot become a free agent until after the 2019 season.

In terms of what the Astros acquired, analysis of this is pretty simple.  Scott Kazmir provided the Astros with just over 73 innings of 4.17 ERA ball, running a 5.19 FIP in the process.  This was in contrast to his 110-odd Oakland innings earlier in 2015, which had resulted in an ERA of 2.38 and a FIP of 3.16.  Kazmir was worth 0.0 bWAR or a 0.1fWAR with the Astros, while having posted a 3.3 bWAR or a 2.3 fWAR in 2015 prior to the trade.

Kazmir's value, however, was perhaps not entirely able to be summed up by season-long stats.  He started his time with the Astros with some phenomenal baseball.  His first two Astros starts involved shutouts - 7 innings in a win against the Royals on July 24 then seven-and-two-thirds against the Angels on July 30 - both allowing only three hits.  After lurching toward the end of the season with some less notable performances, Kazmir then managed a solid postseason start against the Royals in which he allowed three earned runs over five-and-one-third.  Middle relief lost that game (ALDS, Game 2) for the Astros, as they were unable to clean up the mess that Kazmir had left before he was pulled.  Different decision making would have perhaps led to a different outcome, but I recall being madder at A.J. Hinch, Josh Fields and Tony Sipp than Scotty K.

Mike Fiers was much better after his trade than Scott Kazmir, albeit in fewer innings.  He threw just over 62 frames of 3.32 ERA / 4.39 FIP ball, including a memorable August 21 no-hitter against the Dodgers.  Fire's post-trade effort was worth an even-1 in terms of bWAR and 0.6 in fWAR parlance.  Despite this, Fiers didn't get nominated for a postseason start, throwing only one inning in relief in the postseason to cap his 2015 season (he allowed a run in that frame).

Fiers, of course, remains a Houston Astro, and will do until 2019 if the Astros wish.  He has struggled a little this season, throwing just under 100 innings with an ERA of 4.75 and a FIP of 4.79.  To the eye, he has looked like a league-average pitcher who occasionally gets lit up.  The Astros management don't seem to give him much rope when he does get in trouble, so he has had three games this season where he has been hooked before the end of the fourth inning, allowing seven, four and six runs respectively (including the Michael Feliz walk-a-thon in Oakland this last week).

Which brings us to Carlos Gómez.  Sigh.  When I wrote about Gómez prior to the season, I thought that he had a high floor and a potentially a very high ceiling, noting his monster 2013 season (.284/.356/.477 with elite defence).  Many analysts were happy to ignore his struggles in 2015 (where he posted .242/.288/.383 as an Astro, resulting in a bWAR of 0.7 and an fWAR of 0.9) on the basis of injuries.  Despite these injuries, Gómez had a decent postseason: .267/.267/.667 with two home runs.  His intercostal injury meant that he did not start games 1 and 2 of the ALDS.

Strictly speaking, this article should be about the 2015 post-trade value, so perhaps we should finish there by stating that Gómez provided some decent value despite playing time limited by difficult-to-heal injuries.  But 2016 is also happening, and when the Astros gave up Phillips et al, it was because Carlos Gómez was also expected to be something in 2016, as well.  For example, I imagine the Astros would have been factoring a future qualifying offer into the trade decision when they made it.

Well, 2016 has been unkind to Carlos Gómez, who is in the midst of posting the worst season of his career.  His current slash-line sits at .211/.276/.327, and as all reasonable Astros fans know - who have watched his wild swishes and helmet falling off on multiple occasions - Gómez has been less than good.  bWAR and fWAR are in agreement: Gómez has been below replacement level to the tune of -0.3 Wins.  But as A.J. Hinch is probably sick of saying - a productive Carlos Gómez helps this lineup immensely - so he will be given an opportunity to work it all out.

This is only looking at the players that the Astros acquired.  The performance of the players traded away is an article by itself - perhaps the subject of some offseason work by your loyal and hardworking AC staff.  Stay tuned.

What does this analysis of the 2015 Trade Deadline mean??  Well, I guess there are different interpretations for different people, but I would think that the following points should be mostly accepted as truisms (drawing on information from the market this year):

• Buyers are probably - on the whole - going to get hosed in trade negotiations.  Multiple prospects for attainable players (most of which usually have something about them that makes then available) is normally going to result in the buying team getting pounded in the long run.
• Timing is everything.  Flags fly forever and all of that, and I am pretty sure that the Royals would be happy with the moves they made last year despite being hobbled in the starting pitching ranks this year because of those trades.
• Minor leaguers often need a season or two to settle in.  Contending teams often don't have the time to throw them into the big leagues and let them sort their performance out.  They need performance now, and often have to pay for it.  The Brewers have been patient with Villar this year, or Santana last year, but the Astros arguably didn't have that luxury.  Whilst I would love to see some Astros Rookies getting time in September or October, I would probably feel pretty nervous in the event that they were asked to play a meaningful role.
• This year, it seems that there are few genuine rental players, but most of the blockbusters will be trades aimed at 2016, as well as 2017 and 2018.  Trades for Chris Sale, Jose Quintana and Chris Archer would be examples of this trend, which the Ramgers also managed last year in the Cole Hamels trade.  This would be in contrast to say, a trade for Aroldis Chapman, or Scott Kazmir last year, both of whom would get to play two or three months for their new clubs before hitting free agency.  Our rivals across the state seem in a good position to make a trade for a controllable starter, but it will cost them a bevy of premium prospects or young MLB talent if a trade such as this goes ahead.

For 50-odd weeks of the year, I would like nothing more than to work in the Front Office of the Astros.  For the next week, I am glad that I am not there.  Trades are hard, the buying team is likely to give up more talent than they receive, and a late-season slump may make it all for naught.  Best of luck to the Front Office for this one, but my pick is that pick up either a lefty reliever, or a top of the rotation starter who is controlled for a few years (while kissing goodbye to Alex Bregman and Francis Marte).

State of the Astros: 2016 All-Star Break Overview

Last year at this time we posted a State of the Astros piece, analyzing how things had gone for the Astros to the All-Star Break. Now that it's the 2016 All-Star Break, and I'm struggling for #content, it seems like a good idea to trot it back out.

So the Astros came into the 2016 season with lofty expectations of a sustained run of success. This was the first year since 2005 that statement could be made. And it took them approximately a week and a half to flush those expectations down the toilet.

A 5-3 Opening Day win in Dallas Keuchel's return to Yankee Stadium was followed up by the Astros dropping 12 of their next 16 games including the first Rangers sweep of the season. From April 19-April 30 they went 2-9, dropping series at Texas, at home to Boston, at Seattle and at Oakland.

The Astros salvaged the series finale at Oakland on May 1, and then dropped the series opener at home to Minnesota. At this point - following the events of May 2 - the Astros were 8-18, seven games behind the Rangers. The Twins' win on May 2 dropped the Astros into a tie with Minnesota for the worst record in the American League, and only a game and a half better than the Braves for the 29th-best record in all of baseball.

As a team they were "hitting" .227/.312/.405 with 257 strikeouts in 26 games. Oh yeah, and 98 walks. So that's a 2.62 K:BB ratio for Astros hitters. Twelve of those first 26 games saw the opposing starter throw up a Game Score of 60 or better. In games in which the opposing starter threw a 50+ Game Score, the Astros went 3-14. Ay yo a 50 Game Score isn't great, so that was all on the offense. But it also means that the Astros only went 5-4 when the opposing starter threw a Game Score of <50. That's on everybody.

You might think of May 3 as a turning point, and it sort of is a turning point. Like last year, I think of the 2016 Astros as a team in three eras. Opening Day-May 2 was an awful stretch of baseball. May 3-May 22 was a stretch in which the Astros were just mediocre. They went 9-10 in that span, but it also included the 2nd sweep of the Astros by those satanists up north.

As a team they hit .232/.311/.397 in those 19 games with 188 strikeouts, 76 walks. This is a slightly better 2.47 K:BB ratio than what they had put up in the first era. But it included the Astros scoring 78 runs - 22 of which came in two games against the Twins. So that's 56 runs in the other 16 games. If you count a 7-1 May 9 win against Cleveland, and a 10-9 loss at Boston, that leaves 39 runs in 14 remaining games. They were okay. They showed flashes, but just couldn't put it together for more than two games at a time. It was better than not being able to put it together for more than one game at a time, but

That 2nd Rangers sweep marks the end of the 2nd Era of the 2016 Astros, because May 24 marks the dawn of the 3rd Era - the unstoppable Astros. In these 44 games - just over 25% of a baseball season - the Astros have gone 31-13, hitting .259/.336/.427. We'll get to the pitching tomorrow. Maybe Thursday - I'm tired.

The crazy thing is that this 31-13 record includes going 1-3 at Arlington in early June. So the Astros are 30-10 against the Not Ramgers since May 24. That's a ridiculous(ly easy) .750 win percentage. Completely unsustainable, but it's been a fun six weeks.

From where have the successes come? The Astros swept the Orioles. They swept the A's. They won both games at St. Louis. They swept the Mariners. But honestly they just beat the hell out of the Angels. The Astros played nine games against Anaheim over the last six weeks and went 8-1 (eight straight, by the by). Against AL West teams in the last 44 games, the Astros are 17-6. Three of those losses were at Arlington. They're 16-3 against non-Greater Waxahachie AL West teams in their last 19.

They're also getting better - or luckier - at close games. In the first 45 games of the season, up to the start of the 3rd Era of the Astros' season, they were 5-9 in 1-run games and 10-16 in games decided by one or two runs. Since May 24 the Astros are 11-5 in 1-run games and 17-8 in games decided by one or two runs.

These Astros have also performed much better on the road. Up to May 22 the Astros were 7-15 on the road, which follows a fairly predictable pattern dating back to...I don't know...2006? But since May 24 the Astros are 13-7 on the road. It could indicate their competition - the only marginally impressive road series win in this span would be the Royals. They took both games at St. Louis, but there is evidence that the Cardinals are somewhat awful right now.

So here's where we are: the Astros' 2015 season started out hot and they were able to ride it out until the All-Star Break with the promotions of Correa, McCullers, and Velasquez (RIP). This year Astros started out terribly and have had to claw back.

The weird thing is that the Astros and the Rangers have flipped each other's script from 2015. On June 20, 2016 the Astros were 11 games back of the division lead - they've now cut it in half. At the 2015 All Star Break were a half-game back after pissing away a 7-game lead.

BUT! The Astros were up 5.5 on the Rangers. After the 2015 All-Star Break the Rangers were 7.5 games better than the Astros and of course Northeast Burleson won the division. Now the Astros are 5.5 back of the Rangers. Will they be able to do to the 2016 Rangers what the 2015 Rangers did to the Astros? It depends on whether the Astros can actually beat the Rangers.

Dallas has a demonstrated ability to beat the dog piss out of the Astros. The Rangers are 7-22 against South Frisco from the beginning of 2015 to present. The Astros have nine games left against Grand Prairie: six at home and three on the road. But the Astros have 37 games left against AL West teams - 28 against non-Euless teams, against whom the Astros are 20-9 to this point in the season.

The Astros simply can't keep losing to the Rangers. They seem like a different team since the last time they've played (i.e., a .750 team as opposed to a .450 team) but if there's a psychological barrier they have to bust that up like the Kool-Aid Man will straight bust up your den. I'm a big believer in regressing to the mean, but as of right now (and by "right now" I mean "for the last two years") losing to the Rangers is the mean and they have to fix that crap.

There are 73 games left, and nine are against Gun Barrel City. Let's say the Astros go 4-5 against the Rangers down the stretch. 4-5 would feel like a damn pennant win at this point. The Rangers would then automatically be 6.5 better than the Astros. So in the remaining 64 games the Astros would have to make up seven games to get over that hump. If the Rangers go 32-32 (round numbers here), the Astros would have to go 39-25 to match them.

Or the Astros just do what they've done and win 3/4 of their games from here on out and just get in the playoffs. Either way that's the goal because it's a crapshoot after that. Should the Astros make a trade? Sell Valbuena? Acquire pitching? I literally have no idea, and the lack of a HAWT TAKE makes this post automatically suspect. For the 1st quarter of the season the Astros were terrible. For the 2nd quarter they have been amazing. Which one is real?

The answer most likely lies somewhere in between. But, like the 2015 Rangers, the Astros are going to need some help to get to mid-October. If 2016 is a mirror of 2015, then that means the Rangers take a dump while they puke in the bathtub and hand the division to Houston.

I don't know what's going to happen. I'll get in to the ins and outs of the pitching and hitting in the next couple of days. But this is what the Astros are up against. They crapped the bed early, were mediocre in the middle, and have been unbelievable for as long as they were pooping and mediocre. Does this mean that they're as unbelievable as they are just okay? "Okay" is a standard we would have killed to reach just three years ago.

What a difference a season makes.

Lessons to be learned from the 2005 Astros

Now that we are past Memorial Day, and the Astros are once again (tied for) last place, it's easy to go back to the well of 2005 and try to get a bucket of hope and inspiration.

There are some similarities between the 2016 Astros and the 2005 Astros - both were coming off a playoff run. Both had fairly high expectations for that season. Both started off in a piss-poor way and had a pretty giant hole out of which to climb. And...um...well that might just about do it, but let's see what the 2016 Astros can learn from the 2005 Astros.

The 2005 Astros lost a 9-0 game to the Reds on Memorial Day, getting held to five hits by the legendary Reds battery of Aaron Harang, David Weathers, and Todd Coffey. The 9-0 score was run up in the 9th after Roger Clemens allowed 4H/2ER, 7K:1BB in 8IP. So, down 2-0 in the top of the 9th, John Franco allowed hits to all three batters he saw (7.36 ERA), then Russ Springer allowed 3H/4ER, 1K:1BB in 0.1IP (8.62 ERA), then Chad Qualls had to come in to clean it up and get the final two outs to lower his ERA to 5.55. The loss dropped the 2005 Astros to 18-32, last in the NL Central, 15 games behind the Cardinals. Only the Rockies - at 14-35 - had a worse record in the National League. 

So what happened? After that 9-0 loss, the Astros finished the season with a 71-41 record - best in the NL by four games, and a game better than the A's to post the best record in all of baseball. How did they do it?

1. They needed all the help they could get from the offense. 

The Astros averaged 3.56 runs/game over the first 50 games of the season. Their 178 runs scored was 18 runs fewer than the NL's next-worst, the Pittsburgh Pirates, and was the lowest run total in baseball. Over the final 112 games the Astros improved by over a run per game, scoring 4.59 runs/game until the end of the season. 

As a team following that 9-0 Cincinnati loss they were hitting .239/.306/.377. They had only hit 37 home runs as a team, and were striking out almost seven times a game.

Outside of Craig Biggio and Morgan Ensberg the offense was a black hole over the first 50 games. Check it:

Ensberg: .281/.386/.525 (.911 OPS)

Biggio: .291/.349/.525 (.874 OPS)

then

Bagwell: .250/.361/.398 (.759 OPS)

Vizcaino: .239/.301/.358 (.659 OPS)

Lane: .218/.268/.391 (.659 OPS)

Everett: .222/.281/.377 (.658 OPS)

Lamb: .200/.257/.384 (.641 OPS)

Taveras: .250/.300/.335 (.635 OPS)

Ausmus: .248/.325/.295 (.620 OPS)

Berkman: .216/.318/.297 (.615 OPS)

And then someone flipped a switch. From May 31 through the end of the season they hit .264/.330/.421. They went from averaging 0.74 home runs per game to hitting 1.1 homers/game. 

Berkman: .307/.427/.566 (.993 OPS)

Ensberg: .284/.389/.571 (.960 OPS)

Lane: .288/.336/.546 (.882 OPS)

Palmeiro: .272/.327/.435 (.762 OPS)

Biggio: .253/.314/.443 (.757 OPS)

Lamb: .259/.300/.442 (.742 OPS)

Ausmus: .262/.361/.344 (.705 OPS)

Burke: .253/.316/.388 (.704 OPS)

Taveras: .308/.336/.344 (.680 OPS)

Everett: .258/.293/.359 (.652 OPS)

Bagwell's shoulder forced him out of the lineup and he was replaced at 1B primarily by Lance Berkman. That, combined with Mike Lamb's improved play and versatility allowed Phil Garner to field a more potent lineup. You had two guys with an OPS over .760 over the first 50 games, and then as a team they posted a .751 OPS, which is an improvement of almost 70 points...as a team.

2. Stop me if you've heard this one before, but the pitching staff tightened up.

The Astros allowed 226 runs over their first 50 games, or 4.52 runs/game. This was middle-of-the-road as far as the NL went in 2005, but the offense was so poor that the pitching staff had almost no room for error, and they made more errors than they had room. 

The pitching staff posted a 4.37 ERA/1.30 WHIP over the first 50 games of the season, but the problem wasn't the top of the rotation:

Clemens: 3-3, 76IP, 1.30 ERA/0.86 WHIP

Oswalt: 5-6, 75.1IP, 3.23 ERA/1.17 WHIP

Pettitte: 3-5, 63IP, 3.71 ERA/1.25 WHIP

So just to be clear, the Astros lost 20 of the first 32 games in which Clemens/Pettitte/Oswalt started. Combined they threw 214.1IP, 187H/64ER, 176K:55BB for a 2.69 ERA/1.13 WHIP. Clemens was on the wrong end of a 1-0 loss in three of his first four starts. 

And the bullpen was an early disaster, as well:

Springer: 15.2IP, 8.62 ERA/1.66 WHIP

Harville: 13IP, 6.23 ERA/2.08 WHIP

Qualls: 24.1IP, 5.55 ERA/1.56 WHIP

Lidge: 22IP, 3.27 ERA/1.36 WHIP

Wheeler: 21.2IP, 1.66 ERA/1.06 WHIP

Lidge was okay. Wheeler was fantastic. Then you had a whole bunch of bullcrap trying to close out games. 

Over the final 112 games of the season, the Astros allowed 383 runs - the fewest runs allowed in baseball, and 45 runs fewer than the NL's 2nd-lowest total by the Cardinals. This was thanks to a 3.14 ERA/1.20 WHIP. 

The rotation was unbelievable, or at least the top of the rotation was. Over the final 112 games:

Pettitte: 14-4, 1.86 ERA/0.94 WHIP

Oswalt: 15-6, 2.81 ERA/1.22 WHIP

Clemens: 10-5, 2.19 ERA/1.09 WHIP

Backe: 6-5, 4.78 ERA/1.58 WHIP

Wandy: 9-9, 5.46 ERA/1.47 WHIP

Clemens had notoriously bad luck, despite throwing 211.1IP with a 1.87 ERA, the Astros went 15-17 in his starts because he apparently pitched so well that he made the Astros' bats go silent, as well as their opponents' bats. Clemens lost five 1-0 decisions over the course of the season, and didn't give up a run in all five. The Astros scored two or fewer runs in 15 of his 32 starts. No wonder he went back to the Yankees.

But the bullpen's performance was where real improvements were made:

Qualls: 55.1IP, 2.28 ERA/1.05 WHIP

Wheeler: 51.2IP, 2.44 ERA/0.95 WHIP, 9.06 K/9

Lidge: 48.2IP, 1.85 ERA/1.05 WHIP, 12.95 K/9

Springer: 43.1IP, 3.32 ERA/1.02 WHIP

Gallo: 20.1IP, 2.66 ERA/1.38 WHIP

3. They took advantage of bad teams.

The 2005 Astros and the 2005 Cardinals were so good (30 games over .500 and 22 games over .500 down the stretch, respectively) that the Brewers were the only other NL Central team to end the season over .500, and their 57-55 record gave them an 81-81 record. The Cubs went 54-59, the Reds went 52-59, and the Pirates were 45-68. 

The 2005 Astros went 30-22 against NL opponents. They went 8-1 against Cincinnati, 8-3 against Pittsburgh, 6-5 against Milwaukee. This helped the fact that they went 8-13 against the Cubs and Cardinals combined. 

The 2005 NL West was God-awful. The Padres won the division with an 82-80 record, for crying out loud. The Nationals finished last in the NL East and were one game worse than the Padres. and the Astros went 16-9 against NL West teams down the stretch. But if we talk about playing the worst teams in the National League in 2005, the Astros finished the season 32-13 against sub-.500 National League teams down the stretch.

4. They started to win close games.

Again, perhaps this sounds familiar. The 2005 Astros were 5-10 in 1-run games; 7-16 in games decided by 1-2 runs up until Memorial Day. For the last 112 games the Astros went 18-11 in 1-run games and 33-20 in games decided by 1-2 runs.

So the formula set by the 2005 Astros:

1. Hit better

2. Pitch better

3. Take advantage of playing soft teams

4. Win close games

It's an over-simplistic formula, and it's worth remembering that the 2005 Astros dug themselves such a hole that, even with the best record in baseball after Memorial Day, they still finished eleven games back of the Cardinals and didn't win 90 games. It took going 6-0 against the Phillies - five of those games were decided by one run - to take the Wild Card over Philadelphia by one run. The 2016 Astros are not as far back in the division as were the 2005 Astros. Maybe the 2016 offense is better than the 2005 offense (we'll just go ahead and say that Keuchel/McHugh/Fister isn't Clemens/Oswalt/Pettitte). Maybe the 2016 Astros can recreate the magic of 2005, but they're going to need a lot of help along the way. 

Let's check out Brian T. Smith's latest offering

Brian T. Smith has a gem following the Rangers' 9-2 shellacking of the Astros yesterday. With an assist from our good buddy KevinBassStache (who planted the seed of the idea in my angry little head), let's pick it apart for fun.

We'd give you (the Astros) a tombstone on May 23. But you get what you pay for. And the 2016 Astros have barely been worth a thing.

I'm on board so far.

Considering the most disappointing team in the sport has scored five runs in its last 36 innings, it's no wonder the Astros' frazzled fans are wondering such crazy things as why Crane still hasn't spent any real money on his club...

I don't know that payroll is the first thing on Astros fans' collective minds. Payroll criticism is the Olney Gambit - more concern in the media than with fans. Because I can look objectively and see that they're paying Rasmus almost $16 million (which, I still believe the front office didn't think he would accept the qualifying offer. No other potential free agent had done so before.) 

I can look objectively and see that George Springer, Carlos Correa, Collin McHugh, Lance McCullers, Ken Giles, Mike Fiers, Will Harris are all pre-arbitration players and are making approximately league-minimum. I can look objectively and see that, combined, the Astros are paying Jose Altuve and Carlos Correa slightly over $4 million. That's not indicative of an unwillingness to spend, that's indicative of taking advantage of baseball's economics. 

In the last 18 months the Astros have spent about $50 million on Luke Gregerson, Pat Neshek, and Tony Sipp. Doug Fister looks like a steal at $7 million. They've been willing to spend payroll on players to fit their needs at the time. It's debatable how effective that money has been spent, but the construct of the team hasn't called for throwing $100 million at a free agent in the last two offseasons.  And remember, if Cole Hamels wasn't such an ass-clown pony boy (I don't even know what that means), the Astros would be paying him $23.5 million for each of the next three seasons to pitch in Houston. 

...or when general manager Jeff Luhnow is going to construct an everyday lineup that backs the year-plus hype.

I think A.J. Hinch makes out the lineup. Yeah, I'd prefer it if Luhnow sent Marisnick back to Triple-A, but it's Hinch who sits Tony Kemp on the bench while Marisnick tries to hit the weight of an Olympic gymnast. 

"The year-plus hype" was created by the Astros - the same players who currently make up the team now - starting out the 2015 season with an 18-7 record. That's where the hype comes from, the fact that these same guys came out so hot to begin last season.

But as a backward year has unfolded, it hasn't been the team's arms that have dragged this ballclub down...

Yes it has. Astros starters have combined for a -2.5 WAR - 29th in MLB. Relievers have a -1.3 WAR- 25th in MLB. In only twelve of the Astros' 45 games has a starting pitcher thrown a start with a Game Score of 60 or better. They've had seven starts with a Game Score under 30. This team isn't the mid-90s Braves with a 2012 Astros offense. The pitching deserves as much of the blame as the hitting, because - when the starting pitching does its job, you can often count on the bullpen to struggle. The Astros lost five of those 12 starts with a GS over 60. 

The 2016 Stros can't hit. And they don't have the lineup to realistically try.

Jason Castro's OPS is currently 110 points higher than it was in 2015. Colby Rasmus's OPS is 17 points higher than his 8-year career average. George Springer's batting average in 2016: .254. His career batting average: .256. His .802 OPS is currently only 12 points lower than his career OPS. Evan Gattis' .735 OPS in slightly lower than his .770 career OPS, and is 13 points lower than is 2015 OPS. Carlos Correa has struggled more this season than he did in his rookie campaign...but he's a 21-year old making adjustments after a ROY season.

Luis Valbuena's OPS is 144 points lower than it was in 2015, and is 90 points lower than his career OPS. Tyler White's OBP dipped below .300 yesterday and he has cooled off considerably after the heroics of his first week in the Majors. Carlos Gomez is hurt and terrible and his replacement, Jake Marisnick, is healthy and terrible. Super-utility man Marwin Gonzalez's .227 batting average is 52 points lower than his 2015 average, and his .683 OPS is 76 points lower than his 2015, but is exactly in line with his career OPS.

The 2016 Astros' struggles to hit are well-documented, and saying that they're a good-hitting team would be an overstatement. But to say that they "don't have the lineup to realistically try" is misguided. All except White has a track record of at least marginal success, and even he was a logical choice to make the Opening Day roster based on minor-league track record and the Spring Training he enjoyed. The Astros are trying to squeeze whatever value Valbuena has left out of this season, but it's clear he's running out of time - even if Hinch won't play Colin Moran. 

Combined batting average at third base entering Sunday: a lifeless .176. Center field: .184; Catcher: .193. First base: a whopping .232. I know BA is a little outdated in the new millennium, but if you can't hit, you can't hit. 

We've addressed Valbuena. We've addressed Gomez and Marisnick. None of those three have shown that they are worthy of being everyday options for the Astros. But let's try to have a little bit more focus here:

For all the crap I've given Jason Castro over the last three seasons, I'm perfectly happy to point out that his 115 wRC+ is 6th among catchers with 120 PAs this season and is 2nd in the American League behind Wellington Castillo. His .360 OBP is 4th among catchers in the Majors. Since he simplified his swing he is hitting .300/.447/.533. On a team with a lot of problems, Jason Castro is not one of them.

Yes, Brian Smith, batting average is a little outdated because it only tells a portion of an offensive story. The Astros' .312 OBP is 21st in the Majors - 10th in the AL. It's not great, but it's hardly an indictment of an organization. Their 10.1% BB% is 4th in the Majors. Their .173 ISO is 8th in the Majors. Their .402 SLG is precisely middle-of-the-pack in the Majors and 8th in the AL. Yes, the Astros' batting average is stupidly low - 29th in MLB, last in the AL - but that is simply one very limited and narrow way to measure an offense.

And a team that still refuses to spend cash like it plays in the fourth-largest city in the country...

Oh, we're back to this, okay.

...the Astros are about $145 million off the Dodgers' MLB-leading pace...

We're comparing the Astros' payroll to the Dodgers' payroll? The Dodgers have one of the most expensive teams in baseball history, and if we want to go down this rabbit-hole you can say that the Yankees are $17 million of the Dodgers' MLB-leading pace, the Red Sox are $45 million off the Dodgers' MLB-leading pace, the Tigers are about $50 million off the Dodgers' MLB leading pace.

At 27.1 years of age, the Astros have the 2nd-youngest offensive roster in baseball. Castro, Rasmus, and Gattis are in their Age 29 season. Valbuena and Gomez are 30. And you know what the Dodgers' MLB-leading payroll pace has gotten them? 22-23, 3rd in the NL West, 4.5 GB of the Giants. The Astros will pay Carlos Correa and Jose Altuve a smidge over $4m in 2016. The Dodgers are paying Carl Crawford over $21m to put up a .501 OPS in a part-time role. Young players do not cost as much as older players, and payroll is not indicative of on-field success.

Jake Marisnick's a better overall option than MIA Carlos Gomez as is.

Trying to determine if Gomez is better than Marisnick is like trying to determine if you would rather have someone rub their choad or the actual hole of their ass across your top lip.

But Marisnick's sweet running outfield catches against the Rangers were erased by the fact he's batting a measly .116 and has no business being written into a major league lineup right now.

I cannot agree with this more whole-heartedly.

The same can be said of most of the Astros' "hitters," who are pretty much the same guys who either swung big or missed hard throughout 2015. 

Hey hold up. Putting "hit" in quotation marks is my bit. While it is true that "these are pretty much the same guys," Houston is scoring 4.0 runs/game, 20th in the Majors and 11th in the AL. They are allowing 4.8 runs/game, 25th in the Majors and 13th in the AL. Last year the Astros scored 4.5 runs/game, but allowed 3.8 runs/game. While Valbuena/Gomez/Marisnick have been a disaster, and Tyler White looks very much like a rookie, the Astros brought the same guys back while theoretically improving the bullpen and rotation and hoping that some of the statistical anomalies of 1-run games and "clutch hitting" would regress back to the mean. The Astros may be guilty of misreading the stats, but a lot of people can be found guilty of the same crime.

Take away Jose Altuve and what does this team really have at the plate? Potential unfulfilled...in Springer and Correa, who are batting below .255 with a combined 99 Ks in 347 at-bats.

Okay, first of all, you can't just "take away Jose Altuve." Altuve has been unbelievable. A five-game swing in the standings and Altuve gets mentioned for MVP talk. But to call Springer and Correa "potential unfulfilled" is borderline irresponsible. Correa is 21 years old and has played in 143 games - not even a full season of Major League Baseball. Springer has played in 225 career games and has 999 career Plate Appearances. He has 45 home runs and a career .814 OPS. Are they struggling as much as it seems? Correa's power is down from last year (.512 SLG in 2015 to .418 SLG in 2016), but he still has a 114 OPS+ and HE'S 21 YEARS OLD.

Prior to Sunday, the franchise was tied for sixth in MLB in home runs (26) this month while ranking second in walks (86) and ninth in RBIs (86). But when they fail to make contact - which is quite often since 2013 - they don't do anything at all.

Wait. "When they fail to make contact - which is quite often since 2013 - they don't do anything at all." That is true. If you don't make contact, you don't do anything.

And at 24.2% the Astros do have the highest K% in baseball since 2013. But the 2013-2014 Astros are a different animal than the 2015-2016 Astros. They were in a different position in their rebuilding process. The 2013 Astros had Carlos Pena at DH, Matt Dominguez at 3B, Brandon Barnes in CF. J.D. Martinez had not yet turned himself into the second coming of Ty Cobb, posting a .650 OPS in 310 PAs. The 2014 Astros were coming out of it, promoting George Springer and seeing Jose Altuve return to form. But Robbie Grossman still played in 103 games. Jon Singleton hit .168 with a .620 OPS. Matt Dominguez played in 157 games with a .586 OPS. You can compare the 2013-2014 Astros to the 2016 Astros, but you might as well stop with the color scheme. Of the main lineup from 2014 only Castro, Altuve and Springer remain. Keuchel and McHugh are still in the rotation, but Feldman has shifted to the bullpen; Fields has been sent down, and Sipp is still working in the bullpen.

But no, Smith is right, not making contact is not ideal. I'll give him that.

These Astros aren't slumping, either. The same trends seen for the majority of 2015 have been painfully evident this year. When they put up nine runs in Boston? That's the real anomaly.

The Astros are scoring half a run per game less than they did in 2015. We've established that. They have played 45 games and have scored 5+ runs in 21 of them.

Nine runs in a game is the anomaly for the Houston Astros? Nine runs in a game is an anomaly for every team. There have been 1308 games played in MLB this year, and teams have scored at least nine runs in just 8.9% of them. And teams are 110-7 in games where 9+ runs are scored. It's even more of an anomaly in the American League. 651 games have been played in the AL and teams have scored nine runs in 54 of them - 7.9% of the total games. Only three games in the American League have been lost when a team has scored at least nine runs. That nine-run game in Boston is one of them because the pitching, which according to Smith isn't the problem, gave up ten runs. That's the real anomaly.

At its heart, this is still a cheap roster with little up-front investment. Calling up Tony Kemp and Colin Moran was fun for a few hours on Twitter. But both received phone calls ahead of the expected schedule and are only in The Show because the big league alternatives have been swinging at air.

Okay, back to Olney's Gambit. But typically the only reasons someone gets called up from the minors is because of injuries or because the "big league alternatives" aren't performing to their ability. The Astros presumably did not call Kemp and Moran to the Majors as a favor, or to give them a vacation. This is where I'll put some blame on Hinch by insisting on playing Valbuena and Marisnick over Moran and Kemp.

Against lefties this season Marisnick is 1x20 with a .050/.136/.100 line. Kemp's minor-league splits don't offer great hope for success against lefties, but it's at least worth a shot, right? Colin Moran, however, has hit .350/.395/.425 against lefties at Triple-A this season, and against lefty Cesar Ramos on Saturday? Moran rode the bench - didn't even get a single plate appearance. Even using Moran as a platoon option is being mishandled. I just don't understand why you're going to go to the trouble of adding someone to the 40-Man roster, call them up, and then not see what they can do in a limited role.

Manager A.J. Hinch is a less-than-average 103-104 since becoming Bo Porter's replacement. But this has nothing to do with the man who moves the pieces around. This is on the actual parts themselves: roster construction, daily lineup, hoping cheapness pays off instead of blending the promise of youth with proven bats. 

While it's true that the sum of the parts of the 2016 Astros are greater than the whole, everyone is to blame for the failings of this season to this point. The daily lineup is absolutely on Hinch. I don't believe the Astros are hoping "cheapness" pays off - this is the next logical step in the rebuilding process, seeing which of these guys is worth the long-term investment. You don't know which of the youth will pan out yet, so you don't know which "proven bats" to bring in. Carlos Gomez was a "proven bat," even if the Astros were hoping the sand pouring out of his career hourglass was moving a little bit more slowly.

The failings of the Astros are many. It's not just the offense. It's not just the pitching. It's not just the payroll. It's not just the lineups. It's not just Hinch. It's not just Marisnick. It's not just Gomez. It's not just Luhnow. It's not just youth. It's a combination of all of these things, and trying to paint a simplified picture ("Offense is offensive! Spend moneys!") is disingenuous and doesn't come anywhere close to being able to solve the probelm.

This Was Not Inevitable

There was a lot of optimism heading into the season. I personally predicted 93 wins, an easy playoff berth, and then, who knows? It obviously has not worked out that way, so far. 93 wins seems out of the question, at this point, and .500 is becoming more and more of a pipe dream. I've been seeing a lot of talk about how the expectations were flawed, and we should have seen this coming. After all, last year's Astros just snuck into the playoffs with 86 wins, and after their 10 game win streak in April put them 11 games over .500 on May 3, they finished the season 68-69. Then, they proceeded to make very few changes over the offseason, adding a closer  set up guy low leverage reliever and a potential 4th/5th starter. Maybe we shouldn't have expected 8-18, but were the pie in the sky expectations justified?

I think they answer is yes, they were justified. Which in some ways makes this season even more disappointing. Yes, the Astros finished at 86-76, but they also finished with a +111 run differential. They scored the fifth most runs in the American League, and allowed the fewest. We can come up with explanations for why this is, but I think it's safe to say that if they repeated those numbers in 2016, they'd be far better than 86-76, and would finish much closer to their Pythagorean record of 93-69. (I didn't just make my prediction up).

And, Correa was going to get a full season of at bats. Gomez too (who, despite what you may remember, finished the season hitting .318/.370/.571 in his last 19 games last year). The rotation that had the second lowest ERA in the AL, with the third lowest FIP and xFIP, was going to replace 24 starts from Scott Kazmir and Roberto Hernandez with Doug Fister. No loss there, and a potential gain. The bullpen, which, September struggles aside, ended the year easily among the top 5 in the AL, added the fireballer every one said they needed. There was very little reason to expect them to get much worse than their +111 run differential, and a lot of reason to hope they'd get better.

Instead, the bottom fell out in nearly every way it could. The fireball reliever became a HR machine. The reigning Cy Young award winner is sporting a 5+ ERA. The pitching staff that allowed the fewest runs in 2015 has allowed the most in the AL in 2016. The hitting has also dropped to 8th in the league, with some of the worst RISP at bats you can see.

If the Astros were sitting with a +20 run differential, and were below .500 or worse, then we could start talking about whether the lineup construction or plate approach is producing a team that consistently under performs their RS/RA. And how, because of that, maybe we should have kept our expectations in check.

But that's not what happened. The 2015 team was not a fluke, and they were not lucky. They were a good team, that, if anything, under performed. The -36 run differential so far is shocking because it came out of the blue.

The good news is that this is mostly the same team that had a +74 run differential from May 3 on. If they manage to repeat that, history says they will be much better than 68-69.  Whether they will or not is another question entirely.
 

Comparing 2005 to 2016

With the implosion of the Astros last night there were numerous calls on #AstrosTwitter for the Chronicle to run the infamous Tombstone graphic they ran to (ultimately prematurely) note the end of the Astros season after a 15-30 start to follow up a playoff appearance.

There are numerous comparisons to draw here, no? Let's draw them.

The 2005 Astros were a season removed from the 2004 Astros (who were better than the 2005 Astros) deep postseason run that saw them fall to the Cardinals in the NLCS. The 2014 Astros are also coming off a postseason run, albeit not as deep. Still, expectations for both teams were high.

The 2005 Astros saw the departures of some key players: Carlos Beltran and Jeff Kent, namely. The 2016 Astros didn't really have that problem, unless you think of Scott Kazmir and Chad Qualls as having the same importance of Beltran and Kent. You shouldn't think that, provided you do.

So let's get to how the two starts to the season are related, or not.

Overall Record

Through 21 games the 2005 Astros were 8-13, enduring a six-game losing streak in which they got swept at St. Louis, lost both games of a 2-game series at Pittsburgh (both 2-0 losses), and dropped the first game of a three-game series against the Cubs at Minute Maid. Eight of those first 13 losses were by one run, and the 2005 Astros were 4-10 in games decided by one or two runs.

The 2016 Astros are 6-15 overall, having lost eight of their last ten games and seven of their last eight. They are 2-4 in one-run games and 3-8 in games decided by one or two runs.

Verdict: RELATABLE.

Hitting

The 2005 Astros featured some non-existant early-season hitting. Consider that three of the first 13 games ended in extra-inning walk-off 1-0 losses. #AstrosTwitter would have had a collective coronary had this happened in 2016. As a team, the 2005 Astros were hitting .248/.320/.389 after 21 games, with 151K:70BB and 13 home runs.

There were struggles with hitting, but not like what we've seen so far in 2016. Following the 2005 G21 3-2 loss to the Cubs the Astros were hitting .248/.320/.389. Jeff Bagwell was hitting .236/.341/.424. Brad Ausmus was hitting .204/.278/.245. Mike Lamb was hitting .212/.316/.424. But the lineup trotted out by Phil Garner on April 29, 2005 saw every hitter except Ausmus with an OPS over .700. Jason Lane went 0x4 to drop his slash line to .298/.333/.560. Craig Biggio was 0x4 to drop his line to .282/.341/.462.

It was the typical struggle to which we've been used the last 162 games: situational hitting. The 2005 Astros - through their first 21 games - hit .254 with runners in scoring position (44x173 - yeah, I went through the box scores of every single game), and that included a 6x13 game w/RISP against the Reds on April 15. The 2005 Astros had left 157 men on base, an average of  7.48 per game.

The situational hitting for the 2005 Astros did improve. They hit .261 with runners in scoring position over the course of the next 142 games. Overall the 2005 Astros would hit .258/.323/.411 from Game 22 through the end of the season, an OPS increase of 25 points. Considering the League Average in 2005 was a .262/.330/.414 slash line, the 2005 Astros were a slightly below-average offensive team. This is something we knew.

Overall the 2016 Astros are hitting .237/.314/.421. The 2016 Astros' struggles w/RISP are well-documented. With runners in scoring position they're now hitting .180 (33x183) on a .215 BABIP, and they have left 141 men on base, an average of 6.7 per game. This number feels too low by about 20 baserunners per game. Maybe it's low because of all the TOOTBLANs. That said, the 2016 Astros' .735 OPS is 27 points higher than the 2016 American League's overall OPS of .708. This feels unbelievable, but it's true. It just shows how poor the Astros have been when they've *really* needed that hit.

As a whole, the American League is hitting .244/.321/.376 with runners in scoring position on a .289 BABIP. The Astros have 33 hits in 183 At Bats with runners in scoring position. Just to hit League Average, the Astros would have already collected eleven more hits with runners in scoring position. That would present a big difference in the standings, given the number of close games they've played to this point.

Verdict: The 2005 Astros lineup - to this point in the season - was more solid top to bottom, save for the catcher position, a comparison which has already been made. The Astros' situational hitting in 2016 has been atrocious, and turning this around is crucial to saving this season.

Pitching

2005 featured a rotation that included Roy Oswalt, Roger Clemens, and Andy Pettitte. You had Good Lidge, Decent Qualls, Russ Springer, Dan Wheeler. Pitching was not the Astros' problem. After 21 games the overall pitching staff had a 3.44 ERA/1.21 WHIP, with a 2.75 K:BB ratio. Eight of the first 21 starts resulted in Game Scores over 60 and 14 of the first 21 had Game Scores over 50 for the starters. The only real blips came in an 8-7 loss and an 8-5 loss at St. Louis in Games 16 and 18.

The bullpen was solid, too, those first 21 games. Lidge had a 0.93 ERA/1.14 WHIP. Chad Qualls, in his second season in the Majors, had a 2.25 ERA/0.75 WHIP with nine strikeouts to one walk. Dan Wheeler had a 1.64 ERA/1.27 WHIP. Russ Springer had a 2.89 ERA/1.18 WHIP, even if the 6K:5BB were concerning. Chad Harville had one rough outing against Milwaukee (1H/2ER in 0.2IP) but still had a 3.60 ERA/1.40 WHIP.

From Game 22 to the end of the season the Astros' staff as a whole posted a 3.52 ERA/1.23 WHIP. The 2005 Astros had a remarkably consistent rotation, headlined by three major starting pitchers and a good bullpen.

This is where the concern lies, because the 2016 Astros' starting pitching has been atrocious to this point. The good news, in theory at least, is that surely Collin McHugh's 7.56 ERA can't hold up (his FIP *is* 2.92, after all). The lowest ERA in the rotation is Dallas Keuchel's 4.41. Overall, the pitching staff's 5.02 ERA is the worst in the American League. So is the amount of hits allowed, runs allowed, and earned runs allowed. The 28 home runs given up is next-to-last in the League.

Maybe Chris Devenski is the answer. Maybe Lance McCullers' shoulder will pull a Lazarus and he can be inserted into the rotation mid-May. Maybe Mike Fiers can be more effective than his 5.73 ERA/5.51 FIP would indicate. Ken Giles needs to figure his crap out and there should probably be less Michael Feliz in our lives right now.

Verdict: If you would prefer the 2016 Astros' pitching staff to the 2005 Astros' pitching staff, you are likely headed to an inpatient rehab stay.

Conclusion

The 2005 Astros ended the month of May with a 19-32 record and finished out the season 70-41 to clinch a playoff spot in a Game 163. But they dug themselves such a hole that they didn't reach .500 until July 9 (G87). After 21 games the 8-13 Astros were already seven games out of the division lead but got an 81-60 finish and a National League-best 45-30 record after the All-Star break to make the playoffs. There are some similarities between the two teams, but the 2005's correction came in continuing pretty great pitching with steady hitting and improved luck.

The good news for the 2016 Astros is that the fixes that need to be made are obvious: the starting pitching needs to get where it was last year, and the hitters need to take advantage of the opportunities presented.

That said: Keuchel, McHugh, Fiers isn't exactly Oswalt, Clemens, Pettitte. And while there are bright spots on offense (Altuve, Rasmus) mixed with promise (Correa, Springer), there's enough dragging the offense down (Gomez, Castro, Valbuena) that these corrections need to start happening soon, or they're going to run out of time...like the 2005 Astros almost did.

This week in... Lancaster!

This year at Astros County we going to report on the Minor League affiliates in a slightly different way.  Instead of regular daily recaps, we have agreed to adopt an affiliate each, and review how they have done at regular intervals over the season.  I have been assigned the Astros' Hi-A team affiliate, the Lancaster JetHawks.  After all, it is the closest affiliate to my home - just a 12 hour flight, followed by a two hour drive, and I am there!!  I should pop across for a game or two!

Lancaster has been the Astros' affiliate since 2009, and they have been blessed with some strong teams.  The 2009 and 2010 teams weren't strong, but they had some legitimate future stars in them, including José Altuve and Dallas Keuchel, and a couple of other major leaguers no longer in the Astros' system (Jonathan Villar and David Carpenter).  Those teams struggled to break the 55-win barrier (the minor-league season is 140 regular season games).  Things started looking better in 2012, with the arrival of Kiké Hernandez, Domingo Santana, George Springer and Delino DeShields, with that team finishing 8 games above .500 and winning the California League.  The serious talent arrived in 2014, however, with the JetHawks boasting a roster with Carlos Correa, Tyler White, Vincent Velasquez and Lance McCullers Jr as the talent who has already made the major-leagues, and highly rated prospects like Brett Phillips and Mark Appel backing them up.  They also secured the California League title.

The JetHawks this year have a different feel to them.  The Crawfish Boxes thinks they are young, but lacking any obvious star-power, whereas WTHB sees a lot of similarities between the 2016 Lancaster roster and the 2015 Quad Cities roster, while predicting that they will struggle due to inexperience and a lack of left-handed pitching.

It is worthwhile noting, at this point, that the JetHawks aren't that young, at least not as far as the position players go.  The California League has an average age of around 22-and-one-half for position players, and 23 years for pitchers.  The JetHawks have four position players (out of 13) younger than the league average and seven pitchers (out of 15) aged 22 or less.  There is a noticeable lack of high draftees at Lancaster this year, with reliever Riley Ferrell (2015 third rounder) being the highest player taken  Ferrell is also the highest of Fangraphs' prospects in Lancaster (Akeem Bostick is the other popular prospect, and he sits at number 18 on John Sickels' list).  So Lancaster could struggle a bit, particularly with their young pitching.

And struggle they have.  The JetHawks currently sit 5-8 on the season, scoring a total of 56 runs while allowing 75.  Hot starts with the bat to Jason Martin, the lefty hitting 20-year-old outfielder, who has 50 plate appearances, and is slashing to the tune to .349/.440/.535.  Nick Taneilu is hitting for power and average (.300/.321/.480 in 53 plate appearances), whatever that means at Lancaster.  Hi-A repeater and super-utility guy, Marc Wik, is also off to a solid start (.267/.371/.400).

Another position player worth mentioning is Garrett Stubbs, the left-handed hitting catcher who the Astros drafted in the eighth round last year.  Stubbs seems to be demonstrating a strong eye at the plate, but little else, with a .212/.341/.303 line in 41 plate appearances.  Given Jason Castro is a free agent at the end of the year (if he makes it to the end of the year), catcher is a position worth watching in the Astros' system, and if Stubbs shows enough bat, he could have himself a career.  That said, he has just been placed on the minor-league 7-day DL.

Kristian Trompiz, the shortstop / infielder from Venezuela is the last position player that I will mention here, purely by virtue of his age.  Trompiz is struggling, with a .186/.239/.209 triple-slash through 46 plate appearances, but his age (20) is the is the other outstanding feature of the Lancaster position players.  I mention him because this is an aggressive promotion, and it will be worth watching his progression.

As mentioned previously, perhaps the highest-rated prospects are two pitchers, Riley Ferrell and Akeem Bostick.  Ferrell is off to a good starting, allowing no runs - earned or otherwise - through five frames.  He has walked one, struck out nine, and has allowed three hits.  I recall that pundits mentioned that he was potentially on the fast-track to the major leagues when he was drafted last year.  People also said that they saw batters swinging at pitches that later hit them in the stomach, such is Ferrell's movement and deception.  We will certainly keep watching him, but I would expect that he will be in Corpus by mid-season.

Akeem Bostick has struggled in three appearances, allowing six runs (all earned) in 10.2 innings of work.  Home runs have hurt him (3) as have walks (8).  He has also managed to strike out only 5.  Botick, like Stubbs, has also been recently added to the DL.  Doing better among the pitching ranks are starters Brock Dykxhoorn (4R/3ER in 9.2IP, 1 walk versus 10 strikeouts) and Dean Deetz (4ER in 14 innings pitched, but 6BB versus 9K) with reliever Ryan Thompson (2ER in 6.1IP, walking two while striking out 7) also doing well.

That wraps up the first 13 games of the JetHawks' season.  We have some names to watch going forward, and I will try to provide a review on a weekly basis.  Like I said, some useful future ML pieces currently reside at Lancaster, but they are low on star power and highly rated prospects.  Thanks for reading, and feel free to leave comments or feedback below.

The Astros and hitting with runners in scoring position

Let's be clear about something right off the top: The Astros don't have an overall BABIP problem. Their team BABIP is .297, which is 16th overall in the Majors.

Yes they ground into a lot of double plays - 13 of them (though it feels like that number should be far, far higher) - which is tied for 9th in the Majors, and 6th in the American League. Still, they are costly GIDPs - more so than you might think. FanGraphs has a stat called wGDP, which is the number of runs above or below average a player - or for our purposes, a team - has accumulated based on the ability to not hit into double plays. The Astros - and we're only 15 games into the season, mind you - rank 25th at -0.9. The Royals (!) and Angels are the only AL teams below them at -1.5 and -1.6, respectively. -0.5 is considered Below Average, -1 is considered Poor. The Astros are almost Poor. This is something we knew.

What we're seeing is a complete lack of hitting when the Astros need it most - with runners in scoring position. Let's consider the league splits for a variety of situations with runners on base:

Set	Overall	None On	Runners On	RISP
MLB	.245/.314/.395	.239/.306/.401	.253/.325/.401	.246/.327/.384
AL	.241/.306/.387	.237/.302/.387	.245/.312/.388	.231/.304/.359
HOU	.240/.314/.441	.263/.342/.495	.208/.274/.366	.175/.226/.349

Consider the Astros' BABIP vs. all 30 MLB teams (yes, the Astros are included, so you can adjust this slightly - I'm just not in the mood to check 29 teams and average them out):
HOU Overall BABIP: .297 / MLB Overall BABIP: .293
HOU None On BABIP: .314 / MLB None On BABIP: .288
HOU Runners On BABIP: .273 / MLB Runners On BABIP: .299
HOU RISP BABIP: .213 / MLB RISP BABIP: .294

There is a massive disconnect between how the Astros hit overall to how the Astros hit with the bases empty, and then to how the Astros "hit" with runners in scoring position. The 2016 Astros have had runners in scoring position with two outs in 52 plate appearances, and have gotten a grand total of six hits (.115/.179/.250). They have struck out to end the inning in 23 of the 52 of these situations.

The Astros have had eight plate appearances with the bases loaded at any point in the inning. They are 1x8 - Springer's Grand Slam against the Yankees, which feels like it happened fourteen years ago.

The Run Expectancy charts say that, from 2010-2015, if you had the bases loaded with nobody out you could expect to score 2.29 runs that inning. The Astros have scored one total run - and that was on a sacrifice fly. The only hit with runners in scoring position in last night's 2-1 loss to the Rangers came via a Carlos Gomez chopper to the side of the mound that Hamels couldn't field cleanly.

This is absurd. Unsustainable. (Right? RIGHT?! he screeched) So let's dig deeper and find someone we can blame for this mathematical monstrosity. But let's keep in mind that the composite average across the American League with runners in scoring position is .231 with a .280 BABIP.

Colby Rasmus and Tyler White are each 4x11 with two home runs when they come up with runners in scoring position. Of the 34 RBIs in situations where the Astros come to bat with runners in scoring position, Rasmus and White have combined for 16 of those RBI. Jose Altuve is 3x10 with 5RBI w/RISP. These three are excused and may now go to lunch.

George Springer is hitting .188 (3x16) with the aforementioned grand slam as his only damage. Carlos Correa is hitting .176 (3x17). Carlos Gomez is hitting .167 (2x12). Just to be clear, Correa and Gomez have almost as many GIDPs with runners in scoring position (4) as they have hits (5) combined.  Marwin is hitting .125 (1x8) with runners in scoring position. Jason Castro is hitting .100 (1x10). Luis Valbuena is hitting .091 (1x11). Erik Kratz, Evan Gattis, Jake Marisnick, and Preston Tucker have yet to hit water by falling out of the boat or blindly fall into a hit based on the randomness of baseball with runners in scoring position. This is a combined 0x19 with runners in scoring position. This is damn near impossible.

Just to get a wider-angle view of these stats, Altuve, White, and Rasmus are a combined 11x32 (.344) with runners in scoring position. The rest of the team (pitchers excluded) is a combined 11x93 (.118).

I don't know what sort of conclusion I can draw from these God-forsaken stats. Possibilities:

1) They're pressing. After all, the Astros have struck out in 43 of 136 plate appearances w/RISP (31.6%). The AL average is a strikeout in 23.2% of plate appearances w/RISP. Springer alone has seven strikeouts in 16 plate appearances w/RISP. Marwin has struck out in five of his eight plate appearances w/RISP. Gattis has struck out in three of his seven plate appearances. Marisnick has struck out in three of his five plate appearances. This makes sense.

2) It's just bad luck. A BABIP that low across the entire team has to even itself out over the course of the season. This makes sense, too. My fear is that #2 will turn into #1. Each player is going to try so hard to get that hit that they end up Springering the ball, and by that I mean "missing it completely by trying to hit a 600-foot home run."

3) Baseball is a faithless whore and because we are fans of the Houston Astros, a cursed team in a cursed city, we will never be able to have nice things. This, too, makes sense.

Are these small sample sizes? Of course they are, but the Astros have lost seven games by 1 or 2 runs, and have left a total of 46 men on base with a combined 6x59 with runners in scoring position in those seven losses. The sample size is small, but the inability to get a hit with runners in scoring position is looming quite large over the first 15 games of the season.